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I. INTRODUCTION
A decade has elapsed since this Review published what is now
the principal dissertation on products liability law in Montana.'
That article, written during the early stages of development of
products liability law in this state, was drafted with two main
objectives. First, it addressed issues likely to be raised in future
products liability litigation.' Second, it offered a framework for
analysis principally to guide courts and counsel in furthering the
growth of that law.3 After ten years, it is time to assess develop-
ments in the law, and determine what direction courts and counsel
have taken and should take in the future.
This article in many ways follows the format used by the au-
thors of the 1977 article. Initially, -this article recapitulates basic
developments in the areas of strict liability, negligence, and war-
ranty in Montana federal and state courts during the past ten
years. The focus then narrows towards specific issues, particularly
those involving affirmative defenses and evidentiary matters. Fi-
nally, this article sets forth recommendations for future develop-
ment and summarizes legislation enacted by the 1987 Montana
Legislature.
II. DEVELOPMENTS IN LIABILITY THEORIES SINCE 1977
A. Strict Liability in Tort
The Montana Supreme Court adopted the doctrine of strict
liability in actions for injuries caused by defective products in
Brandenburger v. Toyota Motor Sales, U.S.A., Inc.4 in 1973. The
authors of the 1977 article discussed Brandenburger and its earli-
est progeny in some depth.' Although the authors presumably an-
1. Tobias & Rossbach, A Framework for Analysis of Products Liability in Montana,
38 MONT. L. REV. 221 (1977). This Review has also published a student comment on compar-
ative fault principles in products liability law. See Comment, Comparative Principles and
Products Liability in Montana, 41 MONT. L. REV. 269 (1980) (authored by Dominic P.
Carestia).
2. Tobias & Rossbach, supra note 1, at 224.
3. Id.
4. 162 Mont. 506, 513 P.2d 268 (1973).
5. Tobias & Rossbach, supra note 1, at 228-32.
[Vol. 48298
2
Montana Law Review, Vol. 48 [1987], Iss. 2, Art. 3
https://scholarship.law.umt.edu/mlr/vol48/iss2/3
PRODUCTS LIABILITY
ticipated that significant developments would occur often in the
years following 1977,6 such has not been the case. Several decisions
have addressed the strict liability doctrine since that time, both in
federal and state court in Montana, but the developments have not
always been striking. Moreover, court decisions have frequently
suffered from a lack of clarity and of serious analysis. The courts
have sometimes failed to keep the doctrine of strict liability ana-
lytically distinct from other theories of recovery. Much of the
problem, however, is due to the failure of bench and bar alike to
comprehend and articulate fully the meaning of strict liability in
an action to recover damages to persons or property caused by de-
fective products.
The authors of the 1977 article classified product defects by
three categories: manufacturing defects, design errors, and a spe-
cial species of design error commonly referred to as the "failure to
warn" theory.7 Each class of defect will be addressed in light of its
development in Montana.
1. Manufacturing Defects
A manufacturing defect is an unintended and latent imperfec-
tion in a particular portion of an otherwise acceptable line of prod-
ucts.' Cases involving allegations of manufacturing defects fit eas-
ily into the parameters of strict liability doctrine, as an aggrieved
party need only establish by a preponderance of the evidence that
the allegedly defective product was not manufactured according to
the standards or intentions of the manufacturer itself, and that the
defect created an unreasonable risk of harm to the party using the
product.9 Few, if any, cases since 1977 have discussed the manufac-
turing defect problem in any detail. Duncan v. Rockwell Manufac-
turing Co.'0 stands out as the principal manufacturing defect case
in Montana during the past ten years. Duncan reveals the
problems that an injured plaintiff faces in a manufacturing defect
case where the defect does not manifest itself for several years fol-
lowing purchase.
Plaintiff Roy Duncan had purchased and used for several
years a table saw manufactured by Rockwell Manufacturing Co.
The saw came fully assembled at the time of the purchase. Duncan
observed and inspected the saw prior to the sale and noticed no
6. Id. at 295-96.
7. Id. at 255-70. See also AM. LAW PROD. LIAB. 3D §§ 28-34 (1987).
8. Tobias & Rossbach, supra note 1, at 255.
9. Id.
10. 173 Mont. 382, 567 P.2d 936 (1977).
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defect. Following purchase, the saw was placed on the back of
Duncan's truck and was transported some distance to his work-
shop. The saw was then used every day for approximately three or
four months without incident. The saw was moved and then stored
for nearly fifteen months. When he used it again, Duncan seriously
injured his hand. Following the accident, it was discovered that
one of the four legs of the table saw was one-quarter inch shorter
than the other three.1
Duncan sued Rockwell and the retailer of the table saw in
strict liability and breach of warranty. Following discovery, both
defendants moved for summary judgment. 12 Defendants argued
that the product had been subjected to substantial wear through
travel and continuous actual use. There was no direct evidence of a
manufacturing defect that existed at the time of purchase. Contin-
uous use of a product in the face of a lack of direct evidence should
entitle the defendants to summary judgment, or so defendants ar-
gued.' 3 The district court agreed, and on appeal, the Montana Su-
preme Court affirmed."'
In a somewhat controversial decision, the Montana Supreme
Court agreed that, in this particular case, plaintiff had failed in his
burden of proof to establish the existence of a manufacturing de-
fect. 1 5 Relying on its previous decision in Barich v. Ottenstror,6
the court concluded that "[t]he law will not automatically presume
the defect to have been extant at the time the product was under
the control of the defendant, from a mere demonstration of a pos-
sible defect at the time of the accident.' 7 The court agreed with
the plaintiff that continued use of a product over time would not
in itself prevent recovery, so long as the plaintiff offered satisfac-
tory proof of an original defect. "However, where no direct evi-
dence of such defect exists and proof must be made by inference,
• ..continued use by [the] plaintiff may well preclude a finding
[that] the product was defective when placed in the stream of
trade."' 8 The court distinguished this case from those in which
there was a malfunction of a "recently acquired machine, which
11. Id. at 385, 567 P.2d at 937-38.
12. Id. at 384, 567 P.2d at 937.
13. Id. at 387, 567 P.2d at 939.
14. Id. at 388, 567 P.2d at 939.
15. Id.
16. 170 Mont. 38, 550 P.2d 395 (1976). For a discussion of the Barich decision, see
Tobias & Rossbach, supra note 1, at 231-32.
17. Duncan, 173 Mont. at 387, 567 P.2d at 939.
18. Id.
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manifests a latent defect."' 9 The court concluded that the type of
defect observed by Duncan "would be obvious to anyone using the
product for even the shortest period of time upon a simple
inspection."2
Although agreeing with the court's statement of the law, Jus-
tice Haswell concluded that the summary judgment should have
been vacated, and the matter remanded for a trial on the merits.
He argued that the evidence clearly established an inference that
the table saw may have been defective at the time of manufacture.
Relying on Barich and Brandenburger, Justice Haswell reasoned
that the inference was sufficiently genuine so as to preclude sum-
mary judgment.2 ' In a separate dissent, Justice Shea agreed with
Justice Haswell's analysis, and further pointed out other serious
errors in the district court's judgment.2 2 Justice Shea maintained
that the real basis of the district court's summary judgment for the
defendants was that the plaintiff was guilty of contributory negli-
gence. Relying upon section 402A of the Restatement of Torts,
Second, Justice Shea pointed out that contributory negligence
could not be a defense to a strict liability claim.23
Despite the perceptive observations of the dissenters, Duncan
is still the law in Montana. Although more recent decisions of the
Montana Supreme Court suggest that a plaintiff may not be held
as strictly to his duty to inspect a product upon purchase, 2 plain-
tiff's counsel must take care in a manufacturing defect case to de-
velop fully any evidence, whether direct or circumstantial, to es-
tablish that the alleged manufacturing defect existed at the time of
manufacture.
An obvious "defect" of sorts in the Duncan decision is the fail-
ure of the Montana Supreme Court to develop an analytical model
for assessing manufacturing defect cases. Recently, in Rix v. Gen-
eral Motors Corp.,2 5 the court finally articulated the basic analyti-
cal framework to be used in manufacturing defect cases. Michael
Rix was injured when a GM two-ton chassis cab, equipped with a
water tank by the dealer, struck from behind the pick-up truck he
was driving. Rix sued General Motors solely under strict liability
in tort on the theory that the brake line in the cab was defectively
19. Id. at 388, 567 P.2d at 939.
20. Id.
21. Id. at 389, 567 P.2d at 940 (Haswell, J., dissenting).
22. Id. (Shea, J., dissenting).
23. Id. at 390, 567 P.2d at 941.
24. See, e.g., Brown v. North Am. Mfg. Co., 176 Mont. 98, 576 P.2d 711 (1977). The
Brown decision is discussed infra in the text accompanying notes 40-45 & 124-26.
25. - Mont. -, 723 P.2d 195 (1986).
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designed. At trial, the court instructed the jury in such a way as to
raise the subject of manufacturing defect. The jury returned a ver-
dict for the defendant.26
The Montana Supreme Court reversed the jury verdict in
favor of General Motors on the grounds that the jury instructions
did not contain the law applicable to plaintiff's design defect the-
ory.27 Anticipating the possibility that a manufacturing defect the-
ory might arise in this case and other cases in the future, the court
explained the legal basis for pleading a defect theory. The Rix
court chose its standard from a dissenting opinion in a New York
case, Caprara v. Chrysler Corp., which states:"
We will now discuss strict liability under a manufacturing de-
fect theory. Under a manufacturing defect theory, the essential
question is whether the product was flawed or defective because it
was not constructed correctly by the manufacturer:
[Mlanufacturing defects, by definition, are "imperfections
that inevitably occur in a typically small percentage of prod-
ucts of a given design as a result of the fallibility of the
manufacturing process. A [defectively manufactured] prod-
uct does not conform in some significant aspect to the in-
tended design, nor does it conform to the great majority of
products manufactured in accordance with that design."
(Henderson, Judicial Review of Manufacturers' Conscious
Design Choices: The Limits of Adjudication, 73 COL. L. REV.
1531, 1543). Stated differently, a defectively manufactured
product is flawed because it is misconstructed without re-
gard to whether the intended design of the manufacturer
was safe or not. Such defects result from some mishap in the
manufacturing process itself, improper workmanship, or be-
cause defective materials were issued in construction.2 9
Although the concept of manufacturing defects may need re-
finement in subsequent litigation, the Rix decision offers a good
starting point for development. It is unfortunate, however, that it
has taken the Montana Supreme Court nearly fourteen years since
the adoption of strict liability to articulate these concepts.
2. Design Defects
Design error cases are generally subcategorized in one of two
26. Id. at -, 723 P.2d at 197.
27. Id. at -, 723 P.2d at 200.
28. 52 N.Y.2d 114, 417 N.E.2d 545, 436 N.Y.S.2d 251 (1981).
29. Rix, - Mont. at __, 723 P.2d at 200 (quoting Caprara, 52 N.Y.2d at 129, 417
N.E.2d at 552, 436 N.Y.S.2d at 258 (Jasen, Jones & Meyer, J.J., dissenting)).
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ways. The first is the inadvertent design error, where the manufac-
turer unintentionally designs a product in such a way that it will
result in an unreasonable risk of harm to the product's user.30 The
second is the "conscious design choice," which the manufacturer
knows in advance may present a risk of harm to the user.31 Manu-
facturers adopt arguably dangerous designs only because, in their
analysis, the advantages of efficiency and economy outweigh the
risks of harm.32 Some reported strict liability cases in state and
federal court in Montana since 1977 have involved design error
theories. As with manufacturing defect cases, however, courts have
only recently attempted to explain the elements of a design error
case, distinguishing between those design errors which are unin-
tended and those which flow from conscious choice.
In Rix, the Montana Supreme Court relied upon the dissent in
the New York Court of Appeals' decision in Caprara to explain the
standard for a design defect case:
We now discuss strict liability under a design defect theory.
The focus is not whether the product was made according to
specifications, but whether the specifications of the manufacturer
were in some way defective. We adopt the following statement
from Caprara, 436 N.Y.S.2d at 258-59:
In contrast a design defect is one which "presents an
unreasonable risk of harm, notwithstanding that it was me-
ticulously made according to [the] detailed plans and speci-
fications" of the manufacturer (Robinson v. Reed-Prentice
Div. of Package Mach. Co., 49 N.Y.2d 471, 479, 426
N.Y.S.2d 717, 403 N.Y.2d 440 supra.) Thus, unlike manufac-
turing defects, design defects involve products which are
made in precise conformity with the manufacturer's design
but nevertheless result in injury to the user because the de-
sign itself was improper.
3
The court examined defect cases from other states. It also re-
viewed and considered a number of learned articles and treatises
on the subject.34 The court eventually decided to limit itself to dis-
30. Tobias & Rossbach, supra note 1, at 258-261.
31. Id. at 261-62.
32. Id.
33. Rix, - Mont. at - , 723 P.2d at 200 (quoting Caprara, 52 N.Y.2d at 130, 417
N.E.2d at 552-53, 436 N.Y.S.2d at 258-59 (Jasen, Jones & Meyer, J.J., dissenting)).
34. The following cases, articles, and draft legislation are cited at Footnote 1 to the
opinion: Lee v. Butcher Boy, 169 Cal. App. 3d 375, 215 Cal. Rptr. 195 (1985); Ford Motor
Co. v. Pool, 688 S.W.2d 879 (Tex. Civ. App. 1985); Dart v. Wiebe Mfg., Inc., 147 Ariz. 242,
709 P.2d 876 (1985); Prentis v. Yale Mfg. Co., 421 Mich. 670, 365 N.W.2d 176 (1984);
O'Brien v. Muskin Corp., 94 N.J. 169, 463 A.2d 298 (1983); Nerud v. Haybuster Mfg., Inc.,
215 Neb. 604, 340 N.W.2d 369 (1983); Lester v. Magic Chef, Inc., 230 Kan. 643, 641 P.2d 353
30319871
7
Bronson: Developments in Montana Products Liability Law, 1977-1987
Published by The Scholarly Forum @ Montana Law, 1987
MONTANA LAW REVIEW
cussing a standard for measuring conscious design choices resulting
in a risk of harm. It adopted by judicial fiat the standard set forth
in pertinent provisions of the Uniform Product Liability Act
(UPLA) in its 1979 version:3 5
(1) A manufacturer who sells a product in a defective condi-
tion unreasonably dangerous because of a design defect is subject
to liability for harm thereby caused to the ultimate user.
(2) A product may be in a defective condition unreasonably
dangerous if the manufacturer should have used an alternative
design.
(3) In determining whether an alternative design should have
been used, the jury should balance so many of the following fac-
tors as it finds to be pertinent at the time of manufacture.
(a) The reasonable probability that the product as originally
designed would cause serious harm to the claimant.
(b) Consideration of the reasonable probability of harm from
the use of the original product as compared to the reasonable
probability of harm from the use of the product with the alterna-
tive design.
(c) The technological feasibility of an alternative design that
would have prevented claimant's harm.
(d) The relative costs both to the manufacturer and the con-
sumer of producing, distributing and selling the original product
as compared to the product with the alternative design.
(e) The time reasonably required to implement the alterna-
tive design."
The court emphasized that "it would be appropriate for the [trial
court] to supplement the foregoing factors based upon the proof
submitted in the course of trial. '37
The foregoing analysis is applicable only to cases alleging un-
(1982); Caprara v. Chrysler Corp., 652 N.Y.2d 114, 417 N.E.2d 545, 436 N.Y.S.2d 251 (1981);
Boatland of Houston, Inc. v. Bailey, 609 S.W.2d 743 (Tex. 1980); W. PROSSER & W. KEETON,
THE LAW OF TORTS § 99 (5th ed. 1984); W. KIMBLE & R. LESHER, PRODUCTS LIABILITY §§ 131-
138 (1979); Birnbaum & Wrubel, State of the Art and Strict Products Liability, 21 TORT &
INS. L.J. 30 (1985); Note, The Design Defect Test in Washington: The Requisite Balance, 8
U. PUGET SOUND L. REV. 679 (1985); Note, Practicable Alternatives and Design Defects: A
Plaintiff's Burden?-Nerud v. Haybuster Mfg., Inc., 18 CREIGHTON L. REV. 477 (1985); Note,
Strict Products Liability And The Risk Utility Test for Design Defect: An Economic Anal-
ysis, 84 COLUM L. REV. 2045 (1984); Twerski, From Risk-Utility to Consumer Expectations:
Enhancing the Role of Judicial Screening in Product Liability Litigation, 11 HOFSTRA L.
REV. 861 (1983). See also the Uniform Product Liability Act (1979) and the proposed inter-
state commerce "Product Liability Act" (1983), which was never accepted by the U.S.
Congress.
35. UNIF. PROD. LIAB. ACT § 104(B) (1979). An updated version of the Act is found at
Am. Law Prod. Liab. 3d (Primary source documents) (1987).
36. Rix, __ Mont. at __, 723 P.2d at 201 (citing UNIF. PROD. LIAB. ACT § 104(B)).
37. Rix, - Mont. at -, 723 P.2d at 201.
[Vol. 48
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reasonably dangerous design choices. 8 The court has not yet of-
fered a pertinent analysis for a case of inadvertent design error.
Nevertheless, the various citations listed by the court may provide
an ample source of material to attorneys in understanding and ar-
ticulating theories of recovery, and defenses, related to inadvertent
design error cases as well as those involving conscious design
choices. Again, as in the case of manufacturing errors, it is unfortu-
nate that the court took as long as it did following Brandenburger
to develop a framework for analysis of products liability cases in-
volving design errors.
3. Failure to Warn
Failure to warn is really a species of design defect. Typically,
cases alleging failure to warn involve prior knowledge by the man-
ufacturer of some dangerous aspect of the product. The claim then
focuses upon the failure of the manufacturer to warn of these dan-
gerous propensities, or in certain instances, the failure of the man-
ufacturer to develop and utilize an adequate warning of these
propensities.39 Most strict liability cases in state and federal court
in Montana have involved the failure of manufacturers to use any
warning, or at the very least, an adequate warning. A rich body of
case law has developed in this area.
The failure to warn problem was first addressed by the Mon-
tana Supreme Court in Brown v. North American Manufacturing
Co.40 Plaintiff Deane Brown lost his left leg in the auger of a self-
unloading feed wagon manufactured by North American Manufac-
turing Co. His attorneys sued North American in negligence and
strict liability in tort. Plaintiff's theory of recovery was premised
upon design defects in the auger, as well as a failure to warn of
particular dangers posed by the design. The jury awarded a verdict
to the plaintiff, and the defendant appealed."1
North American's principal argument on appeal was that the
only conclusion supported by the evidence introduced at trial was
that the danger in the auger was so "open and obvious" to the
plaintiff that he should have been barred from any recovery.2
North American relied upon decisions from other jurisdictions
holding that products were neither defective nor unreasonably
dangerous within the meaning of section 402A if the danger engen-
38. Id. at -, 723 P.2d at 200.
39. Tobias & Rossbach, supra note 1, at 262.
40. 176 Mont. 98, 576 P.2d 711 (1978).
41. Id. at 101, 576 P.2d at 714.
42. Id. at 104-05, 576 P.2d at 716.
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dered by use of the products was open and obvious to the user.
The supreme court rejected that rule.' 3 Relying upon other author-
ities, the court turned back to the text of 402A and observed that
the "open and obvious danger" rule advocated by North American
was not contained in the rule or the comments thereto. Rather, the
rule originated in a court decision predating the Restatement, and
was therefore subject to careful scrutiny in light of the subsequent
development of the strict liability doctrine.4' Even if the danger
was open and obvious to a plaintiff, the trier of fact was not pre-
cluded from finding the product to be in a defective condition un-
reasonably dangerous to the plaintiff. The open and obvious char-
acter of the defect or danger posed by it was "a factor to be
considered in determining whether the plaintiff . . . assumed the
risk" of any dangers posed by the product."5 In a subsequent case,
also involving injury from a grain auger, the court reaffirmed its
previous position regarding the inapplicability of the open and ob-
vious rule.' 6
The court has also had occasion to address the evidentiary re-
quirements necessary to establish a failure to warn. In Hill v.
Squibb & Sons, E.R.,'7 the court concluded that, in some instances,
expert testimony would be necessary to establish whether a prod-
uct warning was inadequate and therefore potentially dangerous to
consumers. Plaintiff Victor Hill brought an action against a drug
manufacturer for negligently marketing certain steroid products.
The products in question were on all occasions administered to
Hill by a physician. Hill alleged that certain package inserts sold
with the drug did not contain precise warnings about possible dan-
gerous side effects. After several years of having taken the drug,
Hill developed the side effects. At trial, defendant Squibb moved
for a directed verdict on the ground that no expert had testified to
the inadequacy of the package insert. The district court granted
the motion, and plaintiff appealed.' 8
The court held that the duty of a drug manufacturer to warn
of dangers inherent in a prescription drug is satisfied if an ade-
quate warning is given to the medical practitioner prescribing and
43. Id. at 106-09, 576 P.2d at 717-18.
44. Id. at 107, 576 P.2d at 717.
45. Id. at 108, 576 P.2d at 717. Despite these observations, the court concluded from
the evidence that the danger in the auger was "hidden" rather than "open and obvious." Id.
at 108, 576 P.2d at 717-18.
46. Stenberg v. Beatrice Foods Co., 176 Mont. 123, 576 P.2d 725 (1978).
47. 181 Mont. 199, 592 P.2d 1383 (1979).
48. Id. at 201, 592 P.2d at 1385.
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administering the drug."9 As a corollary to this rule, the court ob-
served that, since the warnings were directed to medical practition-
ers, only a practitioner or someone with similar experience would
be qualified to testify as to the adequacy of the warning. 0 The
court analogized previous Montana cases in the medical malprac-
tice field to those involving drug manufacturers. The medical mal-
practice cases required expert testimony to establish the standard
of care." The court concluded that plaintiff's failure to elicit any
testimony from an expert that the warning was inadequate was fa-
tal to his claim.2
The Montana Supreme Court has also had occasion to address
proper jury instructions for a failure to warn case. The first occa-
sion came in Rost v. C.F. & I. Steel Corp.58 Plaintiffs Jack Rost,
Virgil Hines, and Helen Olson were injured in an elevator accident.
Deterioration of the elevator cable during operation apparently
caused the accident. They sued the manufacturer of the elevator in
strict liability.8 Plaintiffs pressed the issue of whether the manu-
facturer had failed to warn of dangerous propensities in the eleva-
tor cable . The trial court instructed the jury that the manufac-
turer had a duty to warn users of its products of the dangerous
character of those products "insofar as it is known to the manufac-
turer if, but only if, the manufacturer has no reason to expect that
those for whose use the product is supplied will discover its condi-
tion and realize the danger involved." 56 The jury found for the
manufacturer.57
Plaintiffs argued on appeal that the instruction misstated the
defendant's duty to warn. The supreme court, relying upon section
402A of the Restatement, observed that a manufacturer "may be
required to provide a warning in relation to its product if it is to
avoid a determination that the product is unreasonably danger-
ous." ' The court acknowledged and accepted plaintiffs' argument
that the elevator cable was defective because no warning concern-
ing dangerous use of the cable was given to the ultimate purchaser
and user. In short, plaintiffs' observation was that the duty to warn
49. Id. at 206, 592 P.2d at 1387-88.
50. Id. at 207, 592 P.2d at 1388.
51. Id.
52. Id.
53. 189 Mont. 485, 616 P.2d 383 (1980).
54. Id. at 487, 616 P.2d at 385.
55. Id.
56. Id. at 488, 616 P.2d at 385.
57. Id. at 487, 616 P.2d at 384.
58. Id. at 488, 616 P.2d at 385.
1987] 307
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is measured by an objective standard, i.e., "the care which would
be exercised by a reasonable seller or expected by the ordinary
consumer."" Citing a related Oregon decision, the supreme court
observed that "[t]his standard focuses on the condition of the
product and the degree of danger which would be tolerated by the
reasonable manufacturer apprised of the danger, [which] would
not sell the product without a warning.' '6
The court distinguished this "objective" standard from what it
referred to as the "subjective criteria" used in negligence cases.6 1
Citing Jackson v. Coast Paint & Lacquer Co., 62 an earlier strict
liability case, as well as a pertinent provision of the Restatement of
Torts, the court observed that a claim against a manufacturer on a
negligence theory focuses on the degree of care used by the manu-
facturer during the manufacturing process. It is a standard of care
"measured by the knowledge and reasonable expectations of the
purchaser and of the manufacturer."' I3
The court concluded that the instruction was erroneous. "The
instruction could have lead the jury to believe that the manufac-
turer was relieved of a duty to warn because the store owner had a
prior direct experience with the elevator failing." Despite this er-
ror, the court affirmed the verdict for the defendant. The court
observed that there was sufficient evidence in the record for the
jury to have concluded that the proximate cause of the accident
was the failure of the store owner to inspect the elevator cables
properly and to observe any defects.6 5 This was a "superseding
cause" operating to free the manufacturer from ultimate liability
to the consumer.6
Although the court's reasoning in Rost sometimes confuses
negligence and strict liability concepts as well as the "objective" as
opposed to "subjective" duties of care, the ultimate holding is in-
structive. A manufacturer is not relieved of its duty to warn of any
dangerous propensities in its products, although the manufacturer
may still escape the consequences of a failure to warn or of an in-
adequate warning if a superseding cause is found to be the proxi-
59. Id.
60. Id. (citing Phillips v. Kimwood Mach. Co., 269 Or. 485, 525 P.2d 1033 (1974)).
61. Id. at 489, 616 P.2d at 385.
62. 499 F.2d 809, 812 (9th Cir. 1974) cited in Rost, 189 Mont. 489, 616 P.2d 385. The
Jackson case is discussed in Tobias & Rossbach, supra note 1, at 232.
63. Rost, 189 Mont. at 489, 616 P.2d at 386. This duty was imposed even though the
manufacturer may have exercised due care in the manufacture of the product. Id.
64. Id.
65. Id.
66. Id. at 490, 616 P.2d at 386.
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mate cause of injury.
The next failure to warn case in Montana was Streich v.
Hilton-Davis."' Hilton-Davis had manufactured a chemical known
as "Fusurex." This particular chemical was designed to keep seed
potatoes from sprouting until they had been taken from storage,
aerated, and planted. Streich, a commercial seed potato grower
who had used the chemical, experienced several problems following
application. Among the problems were delayed and erratic emer-
gence following planting, multiple sprouting, and the onset of a
heavy tuber resulting in small potatoes and reduced yield. Along
with two of his customers, Streich sued Hilton-Davis in strict lia-
bility, negligence, and breach of warranty. Plaintiff's principal the-
ory was that the warning on the Fusurex label was insufficient to
advise users that these side effects could be observed.68
The jury agreed with plaintiffs that the warning was inade-
quate.69 The Montana Supreme Court concurred. 70 The court ob-
served that this was a "unique products liability case," mainly be-
cause the product did exactly what the manufacturer represented
it would do; which was suppressing the sprouting process.7 1 The
problem arose from the side effects. The court observed that plain-
tiff's expert had testified as to an array of scientific literature on
field tests of the product.7 2 The literature discussed actual risks
like those experienced by the plaintiffs. Hilton-Davis' failure to
provide warnings of these side effects, in the face of several scien-
tific studies outlining the risks, was sufficient evidence of a "failure
to warn. ' 73 This "failure to warn" amounted to a defect, within the
meaning of section 402A of the Restatement.7 4
The court returned to its earlier reasoning in the Brown and
Stenberg 5 cases in a more recent decision, Tacke v. Vermeer Man-
ufacturing Co.. 71 Plaintiff Tacke was injured when he lost part of
his right foot as a result of an accident involving compression feed
rollers. At trial, the jury was instructed that a manufacturer has no
duty to warn a person who actually knows of the danger.77 The
court held that it was not yet ready to accept the patent-latent
67. __ Mont. - , 692 P.2d 440 (1984).
68. Id. at -, 692 P.2d at 442.
69. Id.
70. Id.
71. Id. at .. , 692 P.2d at 443.
72. Id.
73. Id.
74. See id. at - , 692 P.2d at 444-47.
75. 176 Mont. 123, 576 P.2d 725 (1978). See text accompanying note 46, supra.
76. __ Mont. -. , 713 P.2d 527 (1986).
77. Id. at -, 713 P.2d at 531.
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distinction as a bar to recovery. The court reiterated that manufac-
turers have a duty to warn even of a known danger. 8
The result in Tacke strikes one as somewhat odd, as the plain-
tiff himself had testified at trial that he was aware that the ma-
chine which injured him was dangerous. The court seemed preoc-
cupied, however, with Tacke's additional testimony that he did not
know that he could become entangled in the rollers and thus injure
himself.79 The court observed that the manufacturer had used two
different warning labels at various times. The warning used on the
compression roller that injured plaintiff did not have specific warn-
ings about the specific type of accident that plaintiff experienced.
The new warning, used on products manufactured after plaintiffs
injury, specifically warned of the compression roller danger and
even depicted a person being caught in the rollers."s
Federal courts have also had occasion to develop the failure to
warn doctrine. In Gauthier v. AMF, Inc.,81 plaintiff injured his
hand when he placed it inside the discharge chute of a running
snow thrower while attempting to unclog snow that had caught in
the machine. The particular snow thrower had been designed by
AMF in 1971. Gauthier sued the company in strict liability, alleg-
ing specific design defects. He alleged, among other things, that
the warnings contained on the old machine were inadequate. From
a jury verdict in favor of the plaintiff, AMF appealed to the Ninth
Circuit.82
The Ninth Circuit reversed, pointing out several errors in the
lower court's handling of the evidentiary questions.8 3 Of critical
significance was the lower court's instruction regarding warnings.
At trial, AMF had offered an instruction drawn from the final par-
agraph of comment j to section 402A of the Restatement. 4 That
paragraph reads: "Where warning is given, the manufacturer may
reasonably assume that it will be read and heeded; and a product
bearing such a warning, which is safe for use if it is followed, is not
in a defective condition, nor is it unreasonably dangerous." 85 The
Ninth Circuit took exception to the district court's decision not to
include this instruction. The court observed that plaintiff's expert
78. Id. at __. 713 P.2d at 535.
79. Id. at ., 713 P.2d at 534.
80. Id. at -, 713 P.2d at 534-35.
81. 788 F.2d 634 (9th Cir. 1986).
82. Id. at 635.
83. Id.
84. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 402A, comment j cited in Gauthier, 788 F.2d
at 635.
85. Gauthier, 788 F.2d at 635 (citing comment j).
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had testified that warnings were not a "suitable substitute for
safety features." '86 AMF claimed at trial that the expert "was testi-
fying to a legal duty, and [that] the court [had] promised to give a
cautionary instruction" in response.8 7
The court agreed with AMF that the jury was left to conclude
that defendant's theory of the case had no basis in Montana law.
AMF had argued all along that the plaintiff should have heeded
the written instructions on the machine, and that AMF had the
right to assume that he would." The court noted, and AMF con-
ceded, that adequacy of a warning is a proper jury question. How-
ever, since the legal effect of adequate warnings was an important
issue of law in the case, the court had the duty to instruct the jury
on that issue. Since the instruction was certainly consistent with
previous Montana Supreme Court decisions, including Rost, the
failure of the court to give the instruction was held to be error. 9
In summary, state and federal courts construing Montana law
have been vigorous in developing the failure to warn doctrine.
Even in situations where certain dangers are known to the user,
the manufacturer has a duty strictly imposed by law to provide an
adequate warning of that danger. Plaintiffs are admonished, how-
ever, to examine the issue of adequacy carefully to determine
whether expert testimony will be necessary to prove that the warn-
ing is inadequate. If the product is one generally used or adminis-
tered by professionals, then only those individuals are capable of
testifying as to the adequacy of the warning. On the other hand, it
is sufficient for a witness to simply lay a factual foundation as to
side-effects, such that a jury can conclude on its own, without a
specific finding by an expert, that the warnings regarding a prod-
uct's dangerous propensities may be inadequate or nonexistent.
B. Negligence
Negligence has been frequently criticized as an insufficient
theory on which to establish product liability in an era where the
relationship between manufacturer and consumer is more attenu-
ated. This trend may be one reason why the Montana Supreme
Court has done little to develop the doctrine of negligence as it
pertains to products liability. Realistically, negligence is so well de-
86. Id.
87. Id. The language from comment j was proposed as the format for the cautionary
instruction.
88. Id.
89. Id. (citing Rost, 189 Mont. at 489, 616 P.2d at 385).
90. Tobias & Rossbach, supra note 1, at 233.
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veloped that it needs little analysis.
The most significant reference to negligence in a products lia-
bility context was in the case of Whitaker v. Farmhand, Inc.91 The
Whitaker family had purchased a rather sophisticated circular
sprinkling irrigation system from a Farmhand dealer. After numer-
ous problems and complications with the system, the Whitakers
brought suit against Farmhand and the local dealer. Plaintiffs
sought recovery based on strict liability in tort, negligence in de-
sign, manufacture and installation, and breach of express and im-
plied warranties. At the trial, the court concluded that plaintiffs
were entitled to recover under each theory.92
On appeal, the court gave short shrift to the applicability of
strict liability, believing that the facts of this particular case were
more readily tried on a negligence theory.13 That conclusion is un-
derstandable, as it focused on the conduct of the defendants dur-
ing installation. The court's reasoning is still unusual, as the facts
of the case are perfectly adaptable to a strict liability theory. In
any event, the court's observation that the case was better tried
under a negligence theory also is not especially profound. The
court's analysis of negligence in the context of this case is ex-
tremely conclusory. At best, Whitaker reaffirms the proposition
that human errors in the installation and operation of the product
may form the basis for a negligence action."'
A negligence theory of recovery was also raised in Stenberg,95
one of the two grain auger cases reviewed previously. In addition to
pleading recovery based on strict liability and tort, the injured
plaintiff alleged that Beatrice Foods Co., the manufacturer of the
auger, was negligent in not designing a shield for the intake end of
the auger.96 Interestingly, the trial court took the negligence case
away from the jury on the grounds that plaintiff was guilty of con-
tributory negligence as a matter of law. 7 This trial took place
before the adoption of comparative negligence in Montana.98 Al-
though the contributory negligence doctrine has been repealed by
statute,99 a ruling like that made by the trial court in the Stenberg
91. 173 Mont. 345, 567 P.2d 916 (1977).
92. Id. at 351, 567 P.2d at 919.
93. Id. at 351-52, 567 P.2d at 919-20.
94. Id. at 352, 567 P.2d at 920.
95. 176 Mont. 123, 576 P.2d 725 (1978).
96. Id. at 125, 576 P.2d at 727.
97. Id.
98. MONT. CODE ANN. § 27-1-702 was adopted in 1975. The trial in Stenberg took place
prior to the effective date of the comparative negligence statute. At the time Stenberg was
tried, contributory negligence was a complete bar to a plaintiff's recovery.
99. See MONT. CODE ANN. § 27-1-702 (1985).
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case is still possible under a comparative negligence regime. Con-
ceivably, following presentation of plaintiff's evidence, a court
could still look at the facts and conclude that, as a matter of law, a
plaintiff's negligence, was certainly greater than that of the defend-
ants. Before taking the issue of defendant's negligence away from
the jury, however, a court would still be wise to consult the reason-
ing in Stenberg. The supreme court admonished trial courts to be
careful not to create the wrong impression in the minds of a jury.
In ruling that a plaintiff was guilty of contributory negligence as a
matter of law, the court observed that a jury could well conclude
that the trial court did not think much of the plaintiff's entire
case. This could adversely affect their perceptions of the remaining
theories of recovery. 100 The effect would particularly be drastic if
the only remaining theory of recovery was strict liability, where
contributory negligence is not a valid defense.
Admittedly, the situations justifying removal of a negligence
theory from the jury on the grounds that plaintiff is contributorily
negligent as a matter of law are extremely rare. In any event, the
possibility should convince thoughtful plaintiffs' attorneys of the
problems inherent in trying cases on negligence as well as strict
liability theories. If the plaintiff's case is not argued in terms of
negligence, but only in strict liability, the plaintiff runs less chance
of losing valuable momentum, especially in complex trials involv-
ing serious disputes over causation. 1'0
C. Breach of Warranty
Warranty theories of recovery remain some of the most misun-
derstood in the realm of products liability law. Much of the prob-
lem lies in the failure to comprehend the letter and spirit of the
Uniform Commercial Code, 02 the premise of most warranty theo-
ries. A review of warranty decisions in recent years supports the
conclusion that courts have done a relatively poor job in develop-
ing this area of recovery. In some instances, recovery under a war-
ranty theory has been made more difficult for a plaintiff than
would be anticipated by the law. In other instances, the courts
100. Stenberg, 176 Mont at 128, 576 P.2d at 728.
101. For a discussion of the advantages of pleading and proving a case in strict liabil-
ity alone, see Tobias & Rossbach, supra note 1, at 273-74.
102. See MONT. CODE ANN. §§ 30-1-101 to 30-9-511 (1985). The Uniform Commercial
Code is the product of the National Conference of Commissioners on Uniform State Laws.
The first official text of the code was promulgated in 1951 and published as the "1952 offi-
cial text." For a history of the Uniform Commercial Code, see J. WHITE & R. SUMMERS,
UNIFORM COMMERCIAL CODE (2d ed. 1980). Montana adopted the code in 1963. See 1963
Mont. Laws 264.
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have placed unnecessary hurdles in the way of defendants seeking
to invoke defenses against these claims.
1. Express Warranties
Under Montana law, express warranties may be created in a
number of ways. Typically, "any affirmation of fact or promise"
about a product made by its seller to a buyer, which is part of the
bargaining process, "creates an express warranty that the product
shall conform to the affirmation or promise."' 03 Express warranties
are also created when any description of the product is made part
of the basis of the bargain, such that the product is expected to
conform to the description.104
In the Whitaker decision discussed previously, plaintiffs
sought recovery on a theory of breach of express warranty. Farm-
hand published a brochure setting forth several affirmations and
promises to purchasers of its products. Specifically, the brochure
represented and described the product as "movable, reliable, prob-
lem-free, safe, and capable of extensive use."' 5 Both the trial court
and the supreme court observed that the failure of the system to
meet any of the criteria amounted to a breach of an express war-
ranty. Even though Farmhand had not dealt directly with the
plaintiffs, the court observed that even a remote manufacturer
without privity is liable for breach of express warranty, so long as
the purchaser relies on these warranties to his detriment. 106
The requirement that the purchaser must rely on the warran-
ties is definitely an inaccurate statement of the law of express war-
ranty as set forth in the Uniform Commercial Code. The concept
of "reliance" per se does not appear in section 2-313 of the Uni-
form Commercial Code, which has been adopted without change in
Montana. Comment 31 to section 2-313 provides:
103. MONT. CODE ANN. § 30-2-313(1)(a) (1985).
104. MONT. CODE ANN. § 30-2-313(1)(b), (c) (1985). It is not necessary under Montana
law that a seller use formal words such as "warrant" or "guarantee" to create an express
warranty. Similarly, it is not necessary that the seller have a specific intention to make a
warranty. See MONT. CODE ANN. § 30-2-313(2) (1985).
105. Whitaker, 173 Mont. at 353, 567 P.2d at 920-21.
106. Id. at 353, 567 P.2d at 921 (citing Rogers v. Toni Home Permanent Co., 167 Ohio
St. 244, 147 N.E.2d 612 (1958); Baxter v. Ford Motor Co., 168 Wash. 456, 12 P.2d 409
(1932); Randy Knitwear, Inc. v. American Cyanamid Co., 11 N.Y.2d 5, 226 N.Y.S.2d 363,
181 N.E.2d 399 (1962)).
107. The drafters of the Uniform Commercial Code provided official comments to each
section of the Code. Although the comments are not a part of Montana law, they are in-
cluded in the annotations to tit. 30, chs. 1-9, of the Montana Code Annotated. The Montana
Supreme Court has acknowledged that the Uniform Commercial Code comments are per-
suasive in interpreting the text of the specific provisions of the Code. See, e.g., Norwest
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In actual practice affirmations of fact made by the seller about
the goods during a bargain are regarded as part of the description
of those goods; hence no particular reliance on such statements
need be shown in order to weave them into the fabric of the
agreement. Rather, any fact which is to take such affirmations,
once made, out of the agreement requires clear affirmative
proof.108
The Montana Supreme Court's inclusion of the reliance re-
quirement seems based on a confusion of Uniform Commercial
Code concepts with case law predating adoption of the code.109 The
court has unintentionally established an additional element for
plaintiffs to meet when alleging breach of express warranty.
2. Implied Warranties
Certain warranties in the sale of products may be implied as a
matter of law. The first and most common is the implied warranty
of merchantability. 110 Simply stated, products carry with them an
implied warranty that they will either pass without objection
under the contract description, be of fair average quality within
the description, and/or be fit for the ordinary purposes for which
such products are used."' Similarly, there can be an implied war-
ranty that goods may be fit for particular purposes."' This war-
ranty arises where the seller at the time of contracting with the
buyer has reason to know of any particular purposes for which the
goods are required by the buyer, and that the buyer is relying upon
the seller's skill or judgment to provide or furnish suitable
goods." ' A recent Montana Supreme Court decision makes abun-
dantly clear that the courts have a difficult time understanding
these warranties, as well as distinguishing between them.
In Streich, plaintiffs alleged breach of the implied warranties
of merchantability and fitness for a particular purpose."" The
drafters of the Uniform Commercial Code intended these warran-
ties to be distinct. Comment 2 to section 2-315 of the Uniform
Commercial Code, which was adopted as section 30-2-315 of the
Montana Code Annotated, explains the distinction:
Bank Billings v. Murnion, - Mont. -, 684 P.2d 1067, 1071 (1984).
108. U.C.C. § 2-313, comment 3 (1972) codified in Montana as MONT. CODE ANN. § 30-
2-313 (1985) (emphasis added).
109. See cases cited in note 106 supra.
110. MONT. CODE ANN. § 30-2-314 (1985).
111. Id.
112. MONT. CODE ANN. § 30-2-315 (1985).
113. Id.
114. - Mont. -, 692 P.2d 440 (1984).
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A "particular purpose" differs from the ordinary purpose for
which the goods are used in that it envisages a specific use by the
buyer which is peculiar to the nature of his business whereas the
ordinary purposes for which goods are used are those envisaged in
the concept of merchantability and go to uses which are customa-
rily made of the goods in question. For example, shoes are gener-
ally used for the purpose of walking upon ordinary ground, but a
seller may know that a particular pair was selected to be used for
climbing mountains.115
The court revealed in its discussion of the implied warranty of
fitness for a particular purpose that it did not understand this dis-
tinction. Defendant Hilton-Davis argued that the doctrine of im-
plied warranty of fitness for a particular purpose did not apply to
the facts of the case. Hilton-Davis observed that Fusurex was only
acquired for use as a sprout suppressant. The plaintiffs used the
product for that purpose only. This was the ordinary use of the
chemical.' 16 The court had already concluded that the product did
not conform to its ordinary uses, such that the implied warranty of
merchantability had been breached. Yet the court went on to con-
clude, somewhat strangely, that Hilton-Davis had also breached
the implied warranty of fitness for a particular purpose." 7 In a
confusing discussion, the court concluded that the ordinary use of
Fusurex as a seed suppressant "meant a particular use by Streich,
the fall application of the suppressant for storage of seed pota-
toes.""' 8 Hence, the implied warranty of fitness for a particular
purpose was also breached.
The court's conclusion is striking, especially since it was not
necessary to a finding of liability. There is no indication in the rec-
ord that the plaintiff's use of the product was any different than
that normally intended for the product. Perhaps without realizing
it, the court essentially confused the concepts of ordinary purpose
and particular purpose. The problem with such an approach is that
it affords a plaintiff in a breach of warranty action an additional
theory of recovery where none previously existed, and especially
where none was ever contemplated by the drafters of the code.
Commentators on the code have previously noted confusion by
other jurisdictions in this area," 9 and have concluded that courts
are wise to maintain the distinction between warranties directed to
115. U.C.C. § 2-315, comment 2 (1972) codified in Montana as MONT. CODE ANN. § 30-
2-315 (1985).
116. Streich, - Mont. at -, 692 P.2d at 443.
117. Id. at -, 692 P.2d at 447.
118. Id. at -, 692 P.2d at 448 (emphasis added).
119. See J. WHITE & R. SUMMERS, supra note 102, at 357.
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ordinary purposes, as opposed to those directed to particular
purposes.'"
III. OTHER PRODUCTS LIABILITY ISSUES
So far, this article has focused only upon the basic principles
of liability, whether based in strict liability in tort, negligence, or
breach of warranty. There have been several developments in col-
lateral fields, especially in the doctrines of affirmative defenses to
products liability claims. Interestingly, it is in the area of affirma-
tive defenses that the Montana Supreme Court and the federal
district courts have shepherded perhaps the most controversial
changes. Some of these decisions have been characterized by signif-
icant errors and inconsistencies.
A. Affirmative Defenses
1. Strict Liability
a. Contributory negligence, assumption of the risk, and compar-
ative fault
Most courts and commentators address the concepts of con-
tributory negligence, assumption of the risk, and comparative fault
as separate topics.12' Insofar as these concepts have been addressed
by the Montana courts in the development of affirmative defenses,
they are inextricably interwoven. A historical analysis suggests that
the Montana courts have developed a particularly unique approach
to these doctrines. Although the Montana Supreme Court has fol-
lowed the lead of many jurisdictions and rejected the applicability
of contributory negligence in strict liability actions,'22 it has con-
versely developed a unique approach to the applicability of the
doctrine of assumption of the risk. 23 Moreover, the court has yet
to address and either accept or reject the doctrine of comparative
fault, which is in itself perhaps one of the most controversial topics
120. Id. White and Summers argue that a buyer has nothing to gain by converting a
case alleging breach of the implied warranty of merchantability into a case alleging breach
of the warranty of fitness for a particular purpose. It may be in the buyer's interest to
pursue an action based on breach of the latter warranty only if the buyer believes that a
contractual disclaimer would be effective against the warranty of merchantability, but inef-
fective against the warranty of fitness for a particular purpose. For a list of courts adhering
to the correct interpretation of U.C.C. § 2-315, see the citations collected at J. WHITE & R.
SUMMERS supra note 122, at 357.
121. See, e.g., Daly v. General Motors Corp., 20 Cal.3d 725, 575 P.2d 1162, 144 Cal.
Rptr. 380 (1978).
122. See text accompanying notes 124-26, infra.
123. See text accompanying notes 154-75, infra.
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in the area of strict liability in tort.
In Brown v. North American Manufacturing,24 the Montana
Supreme Court observed that strict liability is not tantamount to
liability without fault. The court recognized limitations on liability
as set forth in comment n to section 402A of the Restatement.
Contributory negligence of the plaintiff is not a defense when
such negligence consists merely in a failure to discover the defect
in the product, or to guard against the possibility of its existence.
On the other hand the form of contributory negligence which con-
sists in voluntarily and unreasonably proceeding to encounter a
known danger, and commonly passes under the name of assump-
tion of risk, is a defense under this section as in other cases of
strict liability. If the user or consumer discovers the defect and is
aware of the danger, and nevertheless proceeds unreasonably to
make use of the product and is injured by it, he is barred from
recovery. 2 "
The court then acknowledged that this standard of conduct would
apply to strict liability cases in Montana.'26 In short, the court re-
jected most versions of contributory negligence as acceptable af-
firmative defenses to strict liability claims. Satisfactory proof of
the elements of assumption of the risk, however, would amount to
an absolute bar to recovery, even if the plaintiff was able to
demonstrate the elements necessary to sustain a strict liability
claim.
Following Brown, development of affirmative defenses took
place primarily in federal court decisions. In Kelly v. General Mo-
tors Corp.,27 Chief United States District Judge James Battin rec-
ognized that negligence or conduct-based considerations cannot be
interjected into actions sounding solely in strict liability. 28 That
case did not involve the validity of an affirmative defense, but
rather, the assertion of a third-party complaint based on negli-
gence theories. 29 Several months later, in Zahrte v. Sturm, Ruger
& Co.,' 30 Senior United States District Judge William Murray was
called upon to address the concepts of contributory negligence and
affirmative defense in a strict liability action. Plaintiff Tim Zahrte
was injured when he set or tossed his pistol onto the stoop in front
124. 176 Mont. 98, 576 P.2d 711 (1978).
125. RESTATEMENT OF TORTS § 402A, comment n cited in Brown, 176 Mont. at 110, 576
P.2d at 719.
126. Brown, 176 Mont. at 111, 576 P.2d at 719.
127. 487 F. Supp. 1041 (D. Mont. 1980).
128. Id. at 1044-49.
129. Id. at 1044.
130. 498 F. Supp. 389 (D. Mont. 1980).
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of his house, resulting in discharge of the weapon into his hand. He
sued the pistol manufacturer in strict liability." 1 At trial, defend-
ant argued that Zahrte knew that a dangerous condition existed in
the weapon, that it was obvious, and that Zahrte voluntarily ex-
posed himself to that danger when working with the pistol. De-
fendant advanced this assumption of the risk defense as a com-
plete bar to recovery. The court instructed the jury that the
defense would constitute an absolute bar. 132 Following trial, the
jury concluded that the plaintiff had indeed assumed the risk of
his injury, and was therefore not entitled to damages. Plaintiff
then moved for a new trial or judgment notwithstanding the ver-
dict, arguing that the court had erred in its instructions to the jury
on this subject.133
As of the time of the decision, the Montana Supreme Court
had not yet addressed the issue of apportionment of loss between
an injured plaintiff and a manufacturer where the plaintiff's fault
had contributed in part to his injury. Judge Murray acknowledged
the development of what is commonly referred to as the doctrine
of comparative fault. 34 Judge Murray specifically cited two devel-
opments in California, where a pure system of comparative fault
had been adopted in strict liability cases.' 35 He then considered
whether comparative fault was available in Montana. He rejected
arguments by the defendant that Montana's comparative negli-
gence statute embodied the comparative fault concept. He con-
cluded that the statute pertained only to damages for negligence,
not strict liability.' 36 Moreover, Judge Murray found that "policy
reasons" militated against utilizing the comparative negligence
statute. 37 Under Montana's comparative negligence scheme, a
plaintiff who is found to be more than fifty percent at fault for his
injuries could not recover anything. Judge Murray concluded that
this would be unfair. The system of pure comparative fault like
that adopted in California, however, would minimize the potential
for windfalls either to the plaintiff or to the defendant.'38
Although the court would not adopt comparative fault via the
comparative negligence statute, it was similarly unwilling to adopt
131. Id. at 390.
132. Id.
133. Id.
134. Id. at 391 n.1.
135. Id. at 391 (citing Daly v. General Motors Corp., 20 Cal. 3d 725, 575 P.2d 1162,
144 Cal. Rptr. 380 (1978)).
136. Id. at 391-92.
137. Id. at 392.
138. Id.
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plaintiff's argument that assumption of the risk should operate
only as a partial bar to recovery. Citing Brown v. North American
Manufacturing Co.' 39 and comment n of section 402A, the court
reasoned that assumption of the risk and comparative fault are
necessarily distinct. Assumption of the risk, according to the court,
was a difficult defense to establish, and defendants should not have
to face the prospect of funding a full recovery to a plaintiff who is
found to have known and appreciated the dangers inherent in the
product. The court concluded that it was therefore correct in in-
structing the jury that assumption of the risk would amount to an
absolute bar to recovery. 140 Judge Murray left it for the Montana
Supreme Court to decide whether to absorb assumption of the risk
into a pure comparative fault scheme.14 1
Five months later, another federal court sitting in Montana
reached a slightly different conclusion. In Trust Corp. of Montana
v. Piper Aircraft Corp.,"8 Federal District Judge Paul Hatfield
adopted the doctrine of comparative fault as set forth in Califor-
nia, and merged the doctrine of assumption of the risk into that
doctrine." 3 Trust Corporation of Montana was the personal repre-
sentative of the estate of Marlin Wagner. Wagner was the pilot of
an aircraft that struck a telephone wire shortly after takeoff, re-
sulting in a crash. Plaintiff's principal argument was that the
shoulder harness in the plane was improperly designed, and had it
not been so, Wagner would have survived the crash.' 44 At issue,
then, was the so-called "second collision" theory of products
liability."45
Defendant answered plaintiff's complaint alleging several af-
firmative defenses, including contributory negligence, assumption
of the risk, and misuse. Plaintiff moved to strike these defenses as
inappropriate in a strict liability action."14 Although Judge
Hatfield agreed that these particular defenses should be stricken,
he concluded that a jury was still entitled to consider the plaintiff's
fault as a damage-reducing factor." 7
The principal difference between Judge Hatfield's reasoning in
Trust Corp. of Montana and Judge Murray's reasoning in Zahrte
139. 176 Mont. at 110-11, 576 P.2d at 719.
140. Id. at 392-93.
141. Id. at 393.
142. 506 F. Supp. 1093 (D. Mont. 1981).
143. Id. at 1098-99.
144. Id. at 1094.
145. Id.
146. Id. at 1098.
147. Id.
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is that Judge Hatfield was convinced that the Montana Supreme
Court would adopt the pure comparative fault doctrine. 148 Under
pure comparative fault, even assumption of the risk would not
then operate as a complete bar to recovery. 1 9 Judge Hatfield was
influenced by a recent Montana Supreme Court decision,
Kopischke v. First Continental Corp.5" Kopischke involved a
claim for negligence by a driver against the seller of an automobile.
The plaintiff had been seriously injured when the automobile dis-
integrated while in motion, causing the accident. The defendant in
Kopischke had raised the defense of assumption of the risk.15 Al-
though the supreme court concluded that the defendant had failed
to establish the requisite elements of that doctrine, the court an-
nounced in dicta that assumption of the risk would be treated
"like any other form of contributory negligence and [would be] ap-
portion[ed] under the comparative negligence statute."'' 5 Judge
Hatfield took this statement as an indication that the Montana Su-
preme Court would rule in a similar fashion in a products liability
case. 153 Such a ruling would essentially amount to the adoption of
the comparative fault doctrine.
For at least three years, several judges and attorneys in Mon-
tana assumed that comparative fault would be the general rule in
strict liability cases. Insofar as the specific affirmative defense of
assumption of the risk was concerned, however, there was still the
prospect that it would operate as an absolute bar to recovery once
the requisite elements of the defense were established at trial. All
of these conclusions were cast to the wind by the Montana Su-
preme Court in 1983 when it announced a unique and questionable
rule on the role of assumption of the risk in products liability
cases.
The Montana Supreme Court's decision was announced in an-
other phase of the Zahrte case.15 4 Shortly after Judge Murray de-
nied a new trial to Zahrte in federal court, his attorneys appealed
the decision to the Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals. 5 5 In an un-
usual move, the Ninth Circuit certified several of the legal issues to
148. Id. at 1096.
149. Id.
150. - Mont. - , 610 P.2d 668 (1980) cited in Trust Corp. of Mont., 506 F. Supp.
at 1097.
151. Id. at -, 610 P.2d at 687.
152. Id.
153. Trust Corp. of Mont., 506 F. Supp. at 1097.
154. Zahrte v. Sturm, Ruger & Co., __ Mont. -, 661 P.2d 17 (1983).
155. Id. at -, 661 P.2d at 17.
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the Montana Supreme Court for review.'5 6 Specifically, the Ninth
Circuit asked the Montana Supreme Court to decide whether the
defense of assumption of the risk still existed as a complete bar to
a plaintiff's recovery in a Montana based products liability ac-
tion.'6 7 Although other questions were also certified, the Montana
Supreme court confined its decision to the first question. The court
surprised bench and bar alike by concluding that assumption of
the risk, while an affirmative defense, was not a complete bar to a
plaintiff's recovery.' 5 8
The court engaged in a historical analysis of its previous deci-
sions. 5 9 It began its review with an explanation of its decision in
Brown. The court concluded that the issue of whether assumption
of the risk was a complete bar to recovery had never actually been
litigated in that case. 60 The court then acknowledged the
Kopischke decision, where it stated that assumption of the risk
would be compared just as contributory negligence was compared
under the comparative negligence statute in regular negligence ac-
tions. '6 The court then commented upon another non-products li-
ability case involving assumption of the risk, Abernathy v. Eline
Oilfield Services, Inc. e2 In Abernathy, the supreme court had
abolished the doctrine of implied assumption of the risk as a de-
fense to negligence actions. Abernathy thus amounted to a clarifi-
cation, if not a complete repudiation, of its previous observations
in Kopischke.1'6
The court somehow concluded from this historical exegesis,
that the doctrine of assumption of the risk, while still applicable in
products liability actions, should not operate as an absolute bar to
recovery. Drawing on language in the Kopischke decision, the
court held that assumption of the risk in a products liability action
would be treated like any form of contributory negligence and ap-
portioned under the comparative negligence statute.' 4
The reasoning in Zahrte is arguably the Montana high court's
most convoluted to date in the field of products liability law. The
156. Id.
157. Id.
158. Id. at -, 661 P.2d at 19.
159. Id. at -, 661 P.2d at 18.
160. Id.
161. Id.
162. - Mont. -, 650 P.2d 772 (1982). Abernathy was a non-products liability
case.
163. See the discussion in Zahrte, - Mont. at -, 661 P.2d at 18.
164. Id. at -, 661 P.2d at 18-19. Upon receipt of the court's opinion, the Ninth
Circuit vacated Judge Murray's decision and remanded the case for trial. Zahrte, 709 F.2d
26.
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decision is so internally inconsistent as to invite serious question as
to the true basis for the ruling. Some have suggested that the court
deliberately ignored a serious attempt to adopt the comparative
fault doctrine in Montana."6 5 Such an accusation may be unfair, as
it is not clear that the court was ever asked to address comparative
fault principles.166 Nevertheless, the conclusion that assumption of
the risk was not an absolute defense was a slap in the face to the
reasoned holdings of federal and state judges who had addressed
the question previously.
The court's decision contains a number of internal inconsis-
tencies. The court acknowledged that assumption of the risk in-
volves application of a subjective standard to the plaintiff's con-
duct. Similarly, the court acknowledged that contributory
negligence "involves the application of a 'reasonable man' standard
which necessarily is objective."' 161 Since the comparative negligence
statute deals only with traditional negligence, and not assumption
of the risk, it is difficult to discern how the court could conclude
that assumption of the risk could be apportioned under the com-
parative negligence statute.
Furthermore, the court observed that assumption of the risk
in a strict liability action is somehow different from common law
assumption of the risk as applied to negligence actions." 8 There is
no support for this proposition. The court reasoned that the de-
fense "as applied in a strict liability action involves unreasonable
exposure to the danger created by the defective product."'6 9 Pre-
sumably, the element of unreasonability had nothing to do with
the common law doctrine of assumption of the risk, a finding not
explained in the decision.
The strangeness of the Zahrte decision is capitalized by its
misconstruction of the court's previous holding in Brown. The ma-
jority claimed that the issue of assumption of the risk was never
really litigated in Brown. The decision clearly contradicts the
court's own observation that the standards as set forth in comment
n to section 402A, including the provision on assumption of the
risk being an absolute defense to strict liability, set forth the law in
165. See. e.g., the dissent of Justice Gulbrandson, discussed in text accompanying
notes 171-75, infra.
166. See the Briefs of Appellant and Respondent, Zahrte v. Sturm, Ruger & Co. Cop-
ies of all briefs submitted to the Montana Supreme Court are kept by the State Law Library
in its archives in Helena, Montana.
167. Zahrte, __ Mont. at -, 661 P.2d at 18.
168. Id.
169. Id. (emphasis in original).
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Montana.'
The Zahrte decision was not unanimous. In his dissent, Jus-
tice Gulbrandson"' criticized the majority for using the certifica-
tion process to announce a change in the law without guidance to
the federal court as to when that change occurred.172 Justice Gul-
brandson maintained that assumption of the risk was still an abso-
lute defense in Montana, even after the Abernathy decision.' 7 'The
justice also observed that the majority had unnecessarily refused to
extend comparative principles except in the limited area where a
plaintiff had voluntarily and unreasonably exposed himself to a
known danger-something that amounted to a departure from the
rule in Brown.17 4 He concluded that the decision would prevent
consideration of comparative fault principles in cases "where the
plaintiff voluntarily and reasonably exposes himself to a known
danger, or where the plaintiff has engaged in negligent conduct." 1"
Since Zahrte, the Montana Supreme Court has not departed
from its unusual holding'" 6 As of this writing, the only apparent
affirmative defense to a strict liability claim is the modified variety
of assumption of the risk. It is a partial defense, treated like com-
parative negligence in a negligence case, even though assumption
of the risk does not involve consideration of objective conduct.
b. Misuse
Some jurisdictions have recognized the defense of misuse as a
possible affirmative defense to a strict liability claim.17 7 As devel-
oped by these jurisdictions, misuse consists of an unintended and
unforeseeable use of the product which produces injury even with-
out consideration of any possible defect in the product. 78 The only
mention of the defense of misuse in Montana was in the Trust
Corp. of Montana case discussed previously.17 9 In a footnote to
that opinion, Judge Hatfield observed that one could argue that
misuse is actually a form of negligence, and therefore is inconsis-
170. See Brown, 176 Mont. 98, 110-11, 576 P.2d 711, 719.
171. Zahrte, __ Mont. at - , 661 P.2d at 19 (Gulbrandson, J., dissenting).
172. Id.
173. Id.
174. Id.
175. Id. at __, 661 P.2d at 20 (emphasis added).
176. Zahrte was affirmed in Kuiper v. Goodyear Tire & Rubber Co., - Mont. __,
673 P.2d 1208 (1983).
177. See, e.g., Kinard v. Coats Co., Inc., 37 Colo. App. 555, 553 P.2d 835 (1976).
178. Id. at 557, 553 P.2d at 837.
179. Trust Corp. of Mont. v. Piper Aircraft Corp., 506 F. Supp. 1093. See text accom-
panying notes 142-53, supra.
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tent with the doctrine of strict liability. 8 ' Moreover, it seems inap-
propriate to categorize "misuse" as an affirmative defense. In situ-
ations where the plaintiff's use of the product is established as the
sole proximate cause of injury, it is conceptually better to say that
the plaintiff has simply failed to establish causation.
At least one commentator has recognized that, with the trend
toward comparative fault principles, "courts should distinguish be-
tween unforeseeable misuse as it relates to a plaintiff's failure to
prove causation . . . and misuse that is characterized as an affirm-
ative defense because it combines with a defect to cause injury. 9181
Even though the Montana Supreme Court has not yet adopted
comparative fault, there is as yet no indication that it will ever
recognize a separate doctrine of misuse as an affirmative defense.
c. Other Defenses
Other possible affirmative defenses have been advanced
against strict liability claims, but without much success. The most
notable defense rejected by the court is the "disclaimer" of liability
that has its roots in the Uniform Commercial Code (U.C.C.). 82
The supreme court has recognized that these disclaimers may op-
erate to bar claims based in breach of warranty.18 However, be-
cause the U.C.C. does not purport to repudiate tort principles, dis-
claimers on product labels or in instruction booklets cannot
operate to preclude tort liability, including strict liability in tort.184
2. Negligence
Presumably, products liability actions grounded in negligence
are still subject to the defense of comparative negligence. Existing
case and statutory law make this conclusion self-evident. One
problem, which has not yet been addressed by the courts, is how to
180. Id. at 1096 n.5.
181. Trine, Product Liability: Meeting the Defenses, TRIAL, Nov. 1985, at 25, 27.
182. See MONT. CODE ANN. § 30-2-316 (1985). A broader discussion of disclaimers is
contained in the text accompanying notes 186-207, infra.
183. Thompson v. Nebraska Mobile Homes, __ Mont. -, , 647 P.2d 334, 338
(1982).
184. See id.; see also Kopischke, 187 Mont. 471, 610 P.2d 668; Whitaker v. Farmhand,
Inc., 173 Mont. 345, 567 P.2d 916 (1977). The policy reason for this holding is simple. War-
ranty law is drafted for the benefit of people with commercial sophistication. Businessmen
are presumed to be competent enough to know the effects of disclaiming rights to recovery
for unacceptable purchases. On the other hand, consumers do not directly negotiate with
manufacturers or sellers for the contract terms of products purchased by them. Rather, they
buy the products virtually "as is," thus making contractual language of disclaimers tanta-
mount to an adhesion contract, or worse.
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approach a multifaceted products liability claim, where the plain-
tiff seeks to recover on negligence as well as strict liability. Under
existing law, the only affirmative defense that the defendant may
plead against the plaintiff on a strict liability theory is assumption
of the risk. 185 However, if the plaintiff continues to argue negli-
gence in the manufacture or design of the product, one may as-
sume that the defendant would still be entitled to plead a compar-
ative negligence defense against the plaintiff. The problem that has
yet to be worked out is how to handle the possible inconsistencies
where a jury finds the defendant strictly liable but also finds that
the plaintiff is more than fifty percent negligent, even though the
defendant is contributorily negligent. Whether the plaintiff may
recover all his damages, a portion, or none at all, remains an open
question.
3. Warranty
The Uniform Commercial Code provides for the exclusion of
modification of express and implied warranties. 8 With regard to
express warranties, words of conduct creating as well as negating
such warranties must be construed together, except that words of
negation or limitation are regarded as ineffective where mutual
construction would be unreasonable.187 Implied warranties, partic-
ularly those pertaining to merchantability, may be excluded by so-
called "disclaimers. 1 88 These disclaimers must be conspicuous.
Implied warranties of fitness may be excluded by general language,
whereas the implied warranty of merchantability must be specifi-
cally disclaimed. 8
Courts in Montana have at least recognized the validity of dis-
claimers. In the Whitaker case cited previously, defendants at-
tempted to argue that the warranties contained in their sales
brochures had been disclaimed by subsequent language contained
in a manual accompanying the product. Adhering to the rationale
in statute and that expressed by the commentators to the code, the
court concluded that a "disclaimer or limitation of warranty con-
tained in a manufacturer's manual received by the purchaser sub-
185. See Zahrte, - Mont. -, 661 P.2d 17.
186. MONT. CODE ANN. § 30-2-316 (1985).
187. MONT. CODE ANN. § 30-2-316(1) (1985).
188. MONT. CODE ANN. § 30-2-316(2) (1985).
189. Id. MONT. CODE ANN. § 30-1-201(10) (1985) provides that a contract term or
clause is "conspicuous" if "it is so written that a reasonable person against whom it is to
operate ought to have noticed it." The statute further provides that a contract provision
within the body of the contract is "conspicuous" if it is in larger type than other provisions,
or is in contrasting color.
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sequent to sale does not limit recovery for implied or express war-
ranties made prior to or at the time of sale." 190 With particular
reference to the comments to the U.C.C., the court concluded that
a conflict between a specific express warranty and a clause exclud-
ing all warranties would be resolved in favor of finding that the
warranty prevails.191
The court later ruled upon the propriety of a disclaimer of im-
plied warranties. That issue was addressed in Transcontinental
Refrigeration Co. v. Figgins.92 A refrigerator company sued its les-
sor for accelerated rent allegedly due from breach of the lease
agreement. The lessor counterclaimed, arguing for rescission of the
contract and, where appropriate, monetary damages, due to alleged
defects in the refrigeration equipment. The lower court found for
the defendant on the counterclaim, and the supreme court af-
firmed. 93 The lessee pointed to language in the lease of the prod-
uct disclaiming implied warranties of merchantability and fitness
for a particular purpose. The court noted that the disclaimer of
warranties in the contract was "in the same type face as the rest of
the contract, and was not indented, underlined or inked in a con-
trasting color. . . and in no way distinguishable or set apart from
the other contract provisions.' '19 Under these circumstances, the
court concluded that the disclaimer was not conspicuous and
therefore ineffective as a matter of law.
The disclaimer defense proved more successful in Schlenz v.
John Deere Co., 195 a federal court case decided a few years later. In
this case, John Deere's contract of sale contained disclaimer lan-
guage like that contemplated by the statute. The words of dis-
claimer were printed in significantly larger type face than the other
printing in the body of the text. Indeed, the disclaimers were the
only words in the body of the text printed in capital letters.'
Under these facts, Judge Hatfield found the disclaimer was con-
spicuous and therefore preclusive of claims based on breach of im-
plied warranties. 9 7 With regard to express warranties, however,
Judge Hatfield followed the lead of the Montana Supreme Court in
190. Whitaker, 173 Mont. at 355, 567 P.2d at 921.
191. Id.
192. 179 Mont. 12, 585 P.2d 1301 (1978).
193. Id. at 17, 585 P.2d at 1304.
194. Id. at 19, 585 P.2d at 1305.
195. 511 F. Supp. 224 (D. Mont. 1981).
196. Id. at 228. The paragraph of disclaimer provided that the manufacturer "EX-
PRESSLY DISCLAIMS THE IMPLIED WARRANTIES OF MERCHANTABILITY AND
FITNESS." An accompanying warranty specifically provided that the manufacturer did
"NOT MAKE ANY IMPLIED WARRANTY OF MERCHANTABILITY OR FITNESS."
197. Id.
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Whitaker and concluded that a subsequent exclusion of express
warranties was insufficient to destroy the express warranty of
safety set forth in the operator's manual provided by the
manufacturer.'
Implicit in the Schlenz decision is the recognition that the
court, and not the jury, decides whether a disclaimer is conspicu-
ous. This is what the drafters of the U.C.C. contemplated; their
wishes are codified in statute. 99 However, the Montana Supreme
Court has at least on one occasion implied that the effectiveness of
a disclaimer is a jury question. The implication was raised in
Thompson v. Nebraska Mobile Homes Corp2 00 The case involved
claims for strict liability in tort and breach of warranty by a mo-
bile home buyer against the manufacturer and the seller of the
home. The district court dismissed the strict liability claim prior to
trial. The jury was then instructed only on theories of negligence,
fraud, and breach of warranty. Specifically, the jury was instructed
that disclaimers can be a defense to warranties. The jury found for
the defendants on all theories, and the plaintiff appealed. The only
issue on appeal, however, was whether the district court had erred
in dismissing the claim for strict liability in tort. 01 The court did
not address matters pertaining to breach of warranty. Neverthe-
less, it is evident from the district court's handling of the warranty
issue that the law regarding disclaimers was not followed. The stat-
ute defining "conspicuous" requires the court, and not the jury, to
make all conclusions about conspicuousness. 02 Any inference in
the Thompson decision that this is a jury question is inconsistent
with the statute and Judge Hatfield's interpretation of state law in
the Schlenz case.20 3
The subject of disclaimers was also raised in a more recent
case, Vandalia Ranch, Inc. v. Farmers Union Oil & Supply Co. 20 4
The court reaffirmed its previous holding in Whitaker that a dis-
claimer or limitation of warranty contained in a manufacturer's
manual received subsequent to sale does not limit recovery for im-
198. Id. at 228-29.
199. See MONT. CODE ANN. § 30-1-201(10) (1985). Although the reasons for this provi-
sion are not readily apparent, it is likely that the drafters of the code were striving for
consistency in interpretation of the concept of conspicuousness. Consistency may be ob-
tained to a greater degree by judicial decision-making. With greater consistency, commercial
enterprises can be more certain as to whether disclaimers on their products will be effective.
200. - Mont. - , 647 P.2d 334.
201. Id. at -, 647 P.2d at 336.
202. MONT. CODE ANN. § 30-1-201(10) (1985). See note 199, supra.
203. Id.
204. - Mont. - , 718 P.2d 647 (1986).
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plied or express warranties made before or at the time of sale.20 5
The more interesting language of the opinion concerns acknowl-
edgment of another finding by the district court in that case that
the disclaimers were unconscionable.20 Unconscionability of dis-
claimers of warranties has been raised in at least one other juris-
diction.0 7 The unconscionability argument has caused much con-
cern to manufacturers who have otherwise felt that their
disclaimers were clearly in compliance with Uniform Commercial
Code guidelines. In any event, the unconscionability argument re-
mains one to be watched for in subsequent litigation.
B. Evidentiary Considerations
1. Causation and Tracing the Defect
A few supreme court decisions in the products liability field
have made instructive comments on the element of causation.
Whether a plaintiff brings his action in strict liability in tort, negli-
gence, or breach of warranty, causation is often the critical element
the jury focuses upon when deciding whether the plaintiff is enti-
tled to recover.
In Brown v. North American Manufacturing Co.,210 the court
tacitly acknowledged that proximate cause remains the critical le-
gal concept with reference to causation. Recent decisions of the
Montana Supreme Court in the area of medical malpractice have
given credence to the "substantial factor test"209 in cases where
more than one cause contributes to an accident or injury. In his
concurring opinion in Streich v. Hilton-Davis,210 Justice Morrison
commented on the appropriateness of the substantial factor test to
strict liability cases.21 Practitioners are therefore urged to be care-
ful when evaluating the causation issue in a products case. If there
is any indication that two or more separate causes have contrib-
205. Id. at -, 718 P.2d at 649.
206. Id.
207. See Durham v. Ciba-Geigy Corp., 315 N.W.2d 696 (S.D. 1982). In that case, the
Supreme Court of South Dakota held that a manufacturer's disclaimer of warranty and lim-
itation of consequential damages, as set forth in a clause accompanying the sale of a prod-
uct, was invalid as unconscionable and contrary to public policy. This decision was reached
in spite of the language of the South Dakota Commercial Code permitting disclaimers of
warranties.
208. 176 Mont. 98, 576 P.2d 711.
209. See, e.g., Rudeck v. Wright, _ Mont. 709 P.2d 621, 628-29 (1985);
Kyriss v. State, - Mont. __, 707 P.2d 5 (1985). For a more recent exposition of the
substantial factor doctrine, see Juedeman v. Montana Deaconess Medical Center,
Mont. -, -, 726 P.2d 301, 305-06 (1986).
210. - Mont. -, - 692 P.2d 440, 450 (1984) (Morrison, J., concurring).
211. Id. at __, 692 P.2d at 450 (Morrison, J., concurring).
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uted to an accident or injury in a products liability context, the
traditional "but for" proximate cause instruction may be inappro-
priate. If given, it may be grounds for reversal.212
In the previous discussion of Rost, mention was made of the
court's recognition of superseding cause. 213 To date, there is no in-
dication that the Montana Supreme Court has abandoned the the-
ory that superseding cause may prove to be a critical element in
future products liability actions. Thus, if a defendant is in a posi-
tion to show that an additional factor brought about the accident
without regard to any specific design or manufacturing defect, a
plaintiff's recovery might be barred.
Problems with the lack of evidence relative to causation can
spell the early end of an otherwise plausible products liability case.
Such was the problem faced by the plaintiff in Brothers v. General
Motors Corp. "" Plaintiff was driving her vehicle down a Montana
highway under relatively normal conditions. While driving around
a gradual bend on the highway, the driver noticed a problem with
the steering wheel. Eventually the wheel would not turn. The car
failed to go around the bend, moved into the right lane, and down
into the median ditch.215 Plaintiff sued the manufacturer and seller
of the vehicle for damages in strict liability in tort and negligence.
Following discovery, defendants moved for summary judgment.
The motion was granted, and the plaintiff appealed. 1
The supreme court affirmed, largely on the grounds that plain-
tiff was unable to meet her burden in showing that a defect caused
the injury, and that the defect was traceable to any of the defend-
ants.21 According to the record, a mechanic had examined the
plaintiff's vehicle subsequent to the accident, but had found noth-
ing wrong. The steering column itself was removed, and again,
nothing was found to be wrong. An expert in the field of mechani-
cal engineering had also examined the steering column and found
nothing wrong. No reason was given for any possible defect. In the
face of this evidence, both the district court and the appellate
court could only conclude that summary judgment was war-
212. See Rudeck, - Mont. at __, 709 P.2d at 628-29 (substantial factor instruc-
tion required in all cases where acts of two or more defendants contribute to in-
jury-implication that failure to give instruction under these circumstances may warrant
reversal).
213. Rost v. C.F. & I. Steel Corp., 189 Mont. 485, 616 P.2d 383 (1980). See text accom-
panying notes 53-66, supra.
214. 202 Mont. 477, 658 P.2d 1108 (1983).
215. Id. at 480-81, 658 P.2d at 1109.
216. Id.
217. Id. at 482-83, 658 P.2d at 1110.
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ranted.218 The court acknowledged that a plaintiff may make out a
prima facie case of liability on circumstantial as opposed to direct
evidence.2 19 Yet the court noted that even circumstantial evidence
of cause was lacking. Such evidence could have been met by "proof
of the circumstances of the accident, similar occurrences under
similar circumstances, and elimination of alternative causes. "220
The court emphasized that no attempt was made to offer any evi-
dence of similar occurrences under similar circumstances. More-
over, and perhaps more importantly, the plaintiff had failed to
eliminate any alternative causes for the accident. No evidence was
offered to show whether tire failure, loss of hydraulic power steer-
ing, or other possible problems may have contributed to the
accident.221
The Brothers decision remains perhaps the court's simplest
articulation of what evidence may be necessary to establish causa-
tion in a products liability case. It is further support for the obser-
vation that, at least in the strict liability context, proof of an acci-
dent itself will generally be insufficient to support a claim for
liability.
In the Brothers case cited above, the plaintiff's inability to
trace any defect to the manufacturer was ultimately fatal to the
plaintiff's claim. Similar problems resulting from an inability to
trace the defect had been discussed in the Duncan case.222 Another
Montana Supreme Court decision, St. Paul Mercury Insurance Co.
v. Jeep Corp.,22 3 also highlights the problem. In that case, plaintiff
was the subrogee of a party whose Jeep Wagoneer had caught fire
while being driven on the highway. 22' The insurance company
brought a products liability action against the Jeep manufacturer
on theories of strict liability, breach of warranty, and res ipsa lo-
quitur. A directed verdict in favor of the defendant was affirmed
on appeal by the Montana Supreme Court.22 5 The supreme court
pointed to plaintiff's failure to elicit any testimony to show a de-
fect in the Jeep, and that the defect had caused the fire. Indeed,
plaintiff's own expert witness testified at trial that he could not
establish that a defect existed in the product when it had left the
218. Id.
219. Id.
220. Id.
221. Id.
222. Duncan v. Rockwell Mfg. Co., 173 Mont. 382, 567 P.2d 936 (1977).
223. 175 Mont. 69, 572 P.2d 204 (1977).
224. Id. at 70, 572 P.2d at 205.
225. Id.
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manufacturer.226
The St. Paul decision, like that in Brothers, illustrates the ab-
solute necessity of being able to trace the defect. The fact that the
supreme court has affirmed two summary judgments and one di-
rected verdict suggests that some attorneys have not been careful
in establishing this particular element of a strict liability action.
2. Subsequent Remedial Measures
Rule 407 of the Federal and Montana Rules of Evidence pro-
vides that evidence of subsequent remedial measures "is not ad-
missible to prove negligence or culpable conduct in connection
with the event. 22 7 Admissibility of such evidence is permitted only
when the evidence is offered for another purpose, such as proving
ownership of property, control of property, impeachment, or the
feasibility of certain precautionary measures. 22a For several years,
courts have wrestled with the question of whether this doctrine,
which was developed for use in negligence actions, is also applica-
ble to claims based on strict liability in tort.229
Although some jurisdictions have concluded that the necessity
of removing negligence concepts from strict liability makes rule
407 inapplicable,30 the Montana Supreme Court and the Ninth
Circuit Court of Appeals, construing state and federal rules of evi-
dence, respectively, have concluded that the rule is applicable in
strict liability actions. The Ninth Circuit reached that conclusion
in the Gauthier case cited previously.231 At trial, plaintiff Gauthier
had brought into court a 1984 Toro snow thrower similar to the
1971 model designed by AMF, for the purpose of comparing it to
AMF's model that had caused the accident. Gauthier's attorney re-
ferred to the 1984 model and its safety features in such a way as to
inform the jury of subsequent remedial measures. Plaintiff's expert
testified that the 1984 model provided safety features that the
226. Id. at 72, 572 P.2d at 206.
227. The full text of the rule, either in its federal or state version, is as follows:
When, after an event, measures are taken which, if taken previously, would
have made the event less likely to occur, evidence of the subsequent measures is
not admissible to prove negligence or culpable conduct in connection with the
event. This rule does not require the exclusion of evidence of subsequent measures
when offered for another purpose, such as proving ownership, control, or feasibil-
ity of precautionary measures, if controverted, or impeachment.
228. See supra note 227.
229. See the cases cited at Gauthier v. AMF, Inc., 788 F.2d 634, 636-37 (9th Cir. 1986).
230. See, e.g., Ault v. International Harvester Co., 13 Cal. 3d 113, 528 P.2d 1148, 117
Cal. Rptr. 812 (1974).
231. Gauthier, 788 F.2d at 637.
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1971 model did not.232 The Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals ac-
knowledged the reasoning of some courts that the goals of rule 407
are not subverted by permitting evidence of subsequent remedial
measures in strict liability actions. 23  The court rejected such rea-
soning, however, at least where the issue is defective design. The
court noted that juries in defective design cases are essentially
asked to decide whether the product is unreasonably dangerous in
relationship to any benefits incurred by use of the product. The
infusion of the "unreasonably dangerous" standard in a defective
design case essentially makes the standard of proof equivalent to a
negligence standard of reasonableness.2 4
The language of the opinion seems to imply that rule 407 ap-
plies to all strict liability cases, whether premised on design or
manufacturing defects. 3 5 Despite this lack of clarity, the court did
reason that evidence of subsequent remedial measures might be
admissible under the exceptions set forth in rule 407, especially if
the evidence is offered to prove feasibility, or for impeachment.2 36
The Montana Supreme Court reached a similar decision with
respect to the Montana version of rule 407 in Rix.2 37 The court
observed that, in a manufacturing defect case, evidence of design
modification is without probative value and irrelevant because the
safeness of the original design is not in issue. In design defect
cases, the court concluded that "evidence of subsequent changes or
alterations in design is not probative of whether the product was
defectively designed at the time of manufacture." Without citing
Gauthier, the court essentially followed the reasoning of the Ninth
Circuit,238 recognizing that the "evidence of design changes might
be probative on matters such as technological feasibility and
impeachment. 2 39
3. Expert Testimony
Earlier discussions of the Hill240 and Brothers2 4 decisions
point to the obvious need to utilize expert testimony in certain
strict liability cases. However, an argument that plaintiff's case
232. Id. at 636.
233. Id. at 636-37.
234. Id. at 637.
235. Id. at 638.
236. Id. at 637.
237. Rix v. General Motors Corp., - Mont. -, 723 P.2d 195 (1986).
238. Gauthier, 788 F.2d at 634.
239. Rix, - Mont. at -, 723 P.2d at 203.
240. Hill v. Squibb & Sons, E.R., 181 Mont. 199, 592 P.2d 1383 (1979).
241. 202 Mont. 477, 658 P.2d 1108.
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failed for want of expert testimony fell on deaf ears in the Streich
case. Defendant Hilton-Davis contended at trial and on appeal
that the plaintiffs needed an expert witness to testify that the
warning on the product was in some way inadequate, thus making
the product defective and unreasonably dangerous.2 4 2 The court
distinguished the facts in Streich from those in its earlier decision
in Hill, noting that plaintiff's expert witness at the very least laid a
foundation that Hilton-Davis knew or should have known of the
results of scientific studies pointing out several adverse side effects
from the use of Fusurex. The fact that plaintiff's expert did not
specifically testify that the warning was therefore inadequate was
not tantamount to a lack of expert testimony on the nature of the
warning. Once evidence of side effects. was introduced, the court
concluded that a layman could very easily conclude, without fur-
ther expert guidance, that the warning was inadequate.243
4. Evidence of Other Accidents
In Tacke,244 the supreme court rejected a narrow test for ad-
missibility of evidence of other accidents in a strict liability action.
Drawing on reasoning from non-products liability cases, the court
observed that evidence of other accidents need not be identical to
that of the instant case to be admissible. The trial court need only
find that the accident involved at trial and other accidents are
"similar" in nature.24 5 If the accidents are similar, the evidence is
admissible to show that the product was either manufactured or
designed defectively.2 4
6
5. Res Ipsa Loquitur
The Montana Supreme Court has twice rejected consideration
of the res ipsa loquitur doctrine in products liability cases. In
Brothers, 7 plaintiff attempted to overcome his problems with
producing evidence of a defect by arguing the application of the
res ipsa loquitur doctrine. The court concluded that res ipsa loqui-
tur is grounded in traditional concepts of negligence. 248 Since negli-
gence focuses on human conduct, as opposed to strict liability,
242. Streich, - Mont. _, -, 692 P.2d 440, 442.
243. Id. at -, 692 P.2d at 443.
244. Tacke v. Vermeer Mfg. Co., __ Mont. - , 713 P.2d 527 (1986).
245. Id. at -, 713 P.2d at 532 (citing Runkle v. Burlington Northern, 188 Mont.
286, 292, 613 P.2d 982, 986 (1980)).
246. Id.
247. 202 Mont. 477, 658 P.2d 1108.
248. Id. at 481-82, 658 P.2d at 1110.
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which focuses on the nature of the product, the doctrine of res ipsa
loquitur is simply inapplicable to strict liability actions.24 The
court reiterated and clarified its position in Rix,25° concluding that
the doctrine was applicable only to products liability actions
grounded on a negligence theory.25" '
C. Miscellaneous Issues
1. "Defective Condition" Versus "Unreasonably Dangerous"
California has dropped the standard of "unreasonably danger-
ous" from requirements of proof in strict liability actions.252 Simi-
lar attempts to modify the evidentiary standard in Montana have
found some support, but have not yet been accepted as a rule of
law. In specially concurring opinions in Brown2 53 and Stenberg,
254
Justice Shea argued for elimination of the "defective condition"
criterion, maintaining that strict liability could be established so
long as the plaintiff was able to present evidence that the product
was in an "unreasonably dangerous" condition.2 55 Justice Shea's
analysis is based on a reading of the comments to section 402A
which emphasize the concept of "unreasonably dangerous" as op-
posed to "defective condition. '256 On several occasions, however,
the Montana Supreme Court has rejected Justice Shea's position,
preferring to keep the traditional language of defective condition
unreasonably dangerous as an evidentiary requirement.2 57
Some confusion as to whether the defective condition require-
ment has been abandoned was brought about by a recent decision,
Kleinsasser v. Superior Derrick Service, Inc.2 58 In that decision,
the supreme court affirmed a lower court finding that defendants
were not negligent for injuries suffered by plaintiff in a derrick ac-
cident. At trial, the jury was instructed on both negligence and
strict liability. The instruction on strict liability was unquestion-
249. Id.
250. __ Mont. -, 723 P.2d 195 (1986).
251. Id. at __, 723 P.2d at 203-04.
252. Cronin v. J.B.E. Olson Corp., 8 Cal. 3d 121, 501 P.2d 1153, 104 Cal. Rptr. 433
(1972).
253. Brown, 176 Mont. 119, 576 P.2d 711, 723-25 (1978) (Shea, J., specially con-
curring).
254. Id. at 123, 133, 576 P.2d at 725, 731-33 (Shea, J., specially concurring). (Justice
Shea was also the author of the majority opinion in Stenberg).
255. Id. at 119-22, 576 P.2d at 723-25; Stenberg v. Beatrice Foods Co., 176 Mont. at
133-36, 576 P.2d at 731-33.
256. See RESTATEMENT OF TORTS § 402A, comment i.
257. See, e.g., Streich v. Hilton-Davis, __ Mont. -, 692 P.2d 440.
258. - Mont. - , 708 P.2d 568 (1985).
19871
39
Bronson: Developments in Montana Products Liability Law, 1977-1987
Published by The Scholarly Forum @ Montana Law, 1987
MONTANA LAW REVIEW
ably confusing. The portion of the instruction given provided that
"defective means 'unreasonably dangerous'. "'259 However, the ver-
dict form given the jury made no mention of strict liability in tort.
The verdict form referred only to the law of negligence. When the
jury concluded that defendants were not negligent, the foreman
simply signed the verdict form and returned it to the court."" On
appeal, the court declined comment on whether the instructions on
strict liability were correct, observing that plaintiff's failure to ob-
ject to the language of the verdict form precluded discussion of any
potential errors related to strict liability.26
Justice Morrison reasoned in his concurring opinion that the
court had given its stamp of approval to the elimination of the re-
quirement of defective condition in jury instructions.2 62 Although
the majority admittedly failed to comment on the language of the
strict liability instruction, its silence can hardly be construed as
acceptance of Justice Shea's position. If the majority had intended
to abandon the defective condition requirement in strict liability
cases, it would have engaged in extensive discussion on that sub-
ject and would have expressly announced any intention to abandon
the standard. Justice Morrison's conclusion that the defective con-
dition requirement has been eliminated is therefore highly
questionable.
2. Scope of Liability and Damages
State and federal courts in Montana have shown a willingness
to extend the doctrine of strict liability to the distant frontiers. In
Thompson,25 the Montana Supreme Court concluded that a plain-
tiff could sue in strict liability even though the only damage exper-
ienced is to the product itself.264 Further, in Streich,265 the Mon-
tana Supreme Court concluded that a commercial purchaser could
sue in strict liability and recover commercial damages.266 With that
ruling, the Montana Supreme Court joined a growing number of
jurisdictions that have concluded that recovery for commercial
losses is acceptable. 6"
259. Id. at , 708 P.2d at 570.
260. Id. at 708 P.2d at 571.
261. Id.
262. Id. at 708 P.2d at 572 (Morrison, J., specially concurring).
263. 198 Mont. 461, 647 P.2d 334.
264. Id. at -, 647 P.2d at 337.
265. - Mont. -, 692 P.2d 440.
266. Id. at -, 692 P.2d at 445.
267. See, e.g., Cloud v. Kit Mfg. Co., 563 P.2d 248 (Alaska 1977); Shields v. Morton
Chem. Co., 95 Idaho 634, 518 P.2d 857 (1974).
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The federal courts have also been somewhat innovative. In
Kelly,28 the federal court prohibited a third party indemnity ac-
tion for negligence when the plaintiffs first party claim was based
solely on strict liability. The plaintiff was injured in the rollover of
a General Motors pickup. Plaintiff sued General Motors and the
manufacturer of the pants that he wore at the time of the accident.
Plaintiff alleged that the burn characteristics of the pants en-
hanced the severity of his injuries. The pants manufacturer filed a
third party complaint against the fabric manufacturer, arguing
that it should be indemnified by the fabric manufacturer for any
judgment obtained by the plaintiff. 69
The fabric manufacturer moved to dismiss the third party
complaint on the grounds that it could not be liable for indemnifi-
cation when the plaintiff was seeking recovery only on a strict lia-
bility theory. In an unusual opinion, the federal court agreed, be-
lieving that the infusion of negligence concepts in the third party
indemnity action would be confusing and prejudicial to the plain-
tiff in the presentation of his case on strict liability.7 0 For some
inexplicable reason, the court apparently rejected the possibility of
bifurcating trial of the strict liability and indemnity actions in or-
der to avoid prejudice to the plaintiff.2 71
3. Retailer Liability
Section 402A of the Restatement contemplates that a "seller"
of a defective and unreasonably dangerous product may be subject
to the doctrine of strict liability. In some instances, the seller of
the product is also the manufacturer. Nevertheless, in a modern
economy, the responsibilities of manufacturing and selling are
often separate. A question has arisen as to whether a party that
merely sells, but does not manufacture, a defective product is also
liable to the ultimate consumer for any unreasonable risk of harm
posed by the use of the product. Several jurisdictions have read
402A literally and concluded that the seller is also liable, although
it is entitled to cross-claim against the manufacturer for indemnity
or contribution.7 2
The issue of retailer liability in Montana has twice been
raised. In both instances, however, the court has never reached a
268. 487 F. Supp. 1041 (D. Mont. 1980).
269. Id. at 1044.
270. Id. at 1047.
271. Id. See Rule 42, FED. R. Civ. P. concerning bifurcation.
272. See, e.g., Vandermark v. Ford Motor Co., 61 Cal. 2d 256, 391 P.2d 168, 37 Cal.
Rptr. 896 (1964).
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conclusion as to whether the mandate of 402A can reach a seller.2 73
Many Montana attorneys have taken the position that 402A is
probably applicable to a seller, and that the seller's only avenue of
relief is to file against the manufacturer on an indemnity or a con-
tribution theory.274 Typically, sellers use this avenue in an attempt
to tender the defense of the action to the manufacturer.273 In some
instances, manufacturers agree in advance by contract to indem-
nify sellers for any harm that the product may cause.276 Only if it
can be established that the seller has an independent basis of lia-
bility does the action for indemnity or contribution fail. 77
At some future time, a seller may move for summary judg-
ment, arguing that strict liability cannot be imposed on one who is
not in a position to know of any defect in the product. The Mon-
tana Supreme Court has expressed an unwillingness to hold sellers
liable for defective products in negligence actions, so long as the
defect was latent and not discoverable by the seller. 78 Whether the
court will extend this doctrine to strict liability claims remains an
open question.
4. Statutes of Limitations
As with actions grounded in negligence, strict liability claims
are subject to the tort statutes of limitation. 79 Disputes over the
273. See Duncan v. Rockwell Int'l, 173 Mont. 382, 567 P.2d 936 (1977); Kopischke v.
First Continental Corp., - Mont. -, 610 P.2d 668 (1980).
274. Indemnity is the right of one discharging a tort obligation to recover the whole
amount of the obligation from another, on the grounds that as between them the primary
liability was on the one against whom indemnity is given. See, e.g., DeShaw v. Johnson, 155
Mont. 355, 472 P.2d 298 (1970); Ryan Mercantile Co. v. Great Northern Ry. Co., 294 F.2d
629 (9th Cir. 1961), aff'g 186 F. Supp. 660 (D. Mont. 1960). Contribution is the right of one
tortfeasor, compelled to discharge the entire obligation to an injured party, to a ratable
portion of the obligation from the other tortfeasor. See MONT. CODE ANN. § 27-1-703(1)-(3)
(1985).
275. To "tender the defense" of an action to a party simply means to request the
party to assume another party's defense, including the payment of any judgment rendered
against all parties, as well as the costs and attorney fees involved in the defense.
276. Likewise, a seller may be required to indemnify the manufacturer for any torts
committed by the seller.
277. This situation usually arises where the manufacturer is sued for some latent de-
fect in its product, whereas the seller or retailer is sued because it made certain representa-
tions or warranties about the product that it knew or should have known were unfounded.
278. See Rogers v. Hilger Chevrolet Co., 155 Mont. 1, 465 P.2d 834 (1970).
279. See Much v. Sturm, Ruger & Co., Inc., 502 F. Supp. 743 (D. Mont. 1980);
Hornung v. Richardson-Merrill, Inc., 317 F. Supp. 183 (D. Mont. 1970); Bennett v. Dow
Chemical Co., - Mont. -, 713 P.2d 992 (1986); Thompson v. Nebraska Mobile Homes
Corp., 198 Mont. 461, 647 P.2d 334 (1982). A tort action for personal injury must be brought
within three years of the injury. See MONT. CODE ANN. § 27-2-204(1) (1985). Tort claims
based on damage to personal property must be brought within two years. See MONT. CODE
ANN. § 27-2-207(1) (1985). See text accompanying notes 280-94, infra.
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application of these limitation periods center almost exclusively on
the circumstances which toll the running of the statute. These dis-
putes, which began in the federal courts, remain largely
unresolved.
In Hornung v. Richardson-Merrill, Inc.2"' federal judge Rus-
sell Smith held that any tort-based products liability claim would
not accrue until the injured party learned, or in the exercise of rea-
sonable care should have learned, the cause of his injuries."8 ' This
protection is generally referred to as a "discovery rule. '282
Hornung involved a products liability action against a manufac-
turer for allegedly adverse side effects arising from the use of the
manufacturer's drug products. The plaintiff was injured sometime
around September, 1963, but his claim was not filed against the
defendant until September, 1968, approximately two years after
the running of the personal injury statute of limitations.2 8 3 Judge
Smith's conclusion that the plaintiff was not automatically barred
from bringing his action was premised on the belief that a plaintiff
in a products liability action should be afforded the same protec-
tions as those afforded in a medical malpractice action, where an
aggrieved party may not know the source of his injury until some
time after undergoing the treatment giving rise to the injury.2 84
Judge Smith did place an equitable limitation upon claims filed
after the expiration of the limitations period. A defendant would
have to show that it was in some way prejudiced by plaintiff's de-
lay in bringing the suit.28 s
A similar analysis was rejected several years later by federal
judge William Murray in Much v. Sturm, Ruger & Co.28 6 Judge
Murray took a more conservative approach to the application of
so-called "discovery rules" to products liability actions. Statutes of
limitation governing fraud8 7 and malpractice 28 8 actions contain
280. 317 F. Supp. 183 (D. Mont. 1970).
281. Id. at 185 (citing Johnson v. St. Patrick's Hosp., 148 Mont. 125, 417 P.2d 469
(1966)).
282. See Much v. Sturm, Ruger & Co., Inc., 502 F. Supp. 743, 745 (D. Mont. 1980).
283. Hornung, 317 F. Supp. at 184.
284. Id. at 185 n.9.
285. Id. at 185 (citing Grey v. Silver Bow Cnty., 149 Mont. 213, 425 P.2d 819 (1967)).
286. 502 F. Supp. 743 (D. Mont. 1980). Unlike the plaintiff in Hornung, the Much case
was not concerned with side effects from drugs, but from injuries sustained by misfire of a
Ruger pistol.
287. "The period prescribed for the commencement of an action for relief on the
ground of fraud . . . is within 2 years, the cause of action in such case not to be deemed to
have accrued until the discovery by the aggrieved party of the facts constituting
fraud. ... See MONT. CODE ANN. § 27-2-203 (1985).
288. An action for medical malpractice must be "commenced within 3 years after the
date of injury or 3 years after the plaintiff discovers or through the use of reasonable dili-
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specific provisions allowing the aggrieved party time to discover
the facts supporting a claim for relief; the tort statute of limitation
has no such provisions. Judge Murray declined to read a discovery
rule into the statute without prior guidance from the Montana Su-
preme Court.289 He also expressed concerns that a discovery rule
"would destroy the very policies which justify the statute of limita-
tions."290 Plaintiffs would be induced into failing to inquire into
the causes of injury, to the prejudice of defendants who were enti-
tled to protection from stale claims.29' Interestingly, Judge Mur-
ray's opinion does not cite or otherwise refer to Hornung.
In Bennett v. Dow Chemical Co.,292 the Montana Supreme
Court recognized both the Hornung and Much decisions, but did
not decide which was the more accurate statement of the law.293
The court confined its ruling to a much narrower question; i.e.,
whether the tort statute of limitations would be tolled until a
plaintiff had consulted with an attorney or had otherwise discov-
ered his legal right to sue for an injury. The court declined to toll
the statute in such a fashion.2 94
Resolution of the so-called "discovery rule" awaits either a de-
finitive ruling from the Montana Supreme Court or a statutory
amendment by the Montana Legislature. Arguably, a precise dis-
covery rule may be beyond formulation. Discovery provisions offer
fairness to a plaintiff who may not have reason to know the cause
of an injury. However, claims long withheld from a judicial forum
pose the prospect of undue prejudice to a defendant facing liability
long after the injury, especially when the disappearance of relevant
evidence and changing circumstances may make presentation of
gence should have discovered the injury, whichever occurs last, but in no case may such
action be commenced after 5 years from the date of injury." See MONT. CODE ANN. § 27-2-
205 (1985).
289. Much, 502 F. Supp. at 745.
290. Id. at 745.
291. Id. at 745-46. Judge Murray also declined to follow a "fraudulent concealment
theory" for tolling the statute of limitations. Id. at 744-45. In Hornung, Judge Smith recog-
nized that fraudulent concealment of certain facts may preclude the running of the statute
of limitations. However, Hornung's complaint was plead not only on products liability theo-
ries, but also on a fraud theory. Judge Smith relied upon the discovery rules in the fraud
limitations statute in concluding that the delay in bringing the fraud claim might be ex-
cused. Hornung, 317 F. Supp. at 184-85. No specific fraud claims were plead in the Much
case and Judge Murray held there was no evidence of fraudulent concealment. Much, 502 F.
Supp. at 744-45.
292. - Mont. -, 713 P.2d 992 (1986).
293. Id. at - , 713 P.2d at 995.
294. Id. Bennett, injured in 1979, did not learn of his legal right to sue the alleged
perpetrators of his injury until 1984, nearly five years after the injury and nearly two years
after the expiration of the personal injury statute of limitations.
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defenses difficult or impossible. These concerns suggest that courts
will be left to balance the competing interest of plaintiffs and de-
fendants on an ad hoc basis.
Limitation periods for warranty claims have also been the sub-
ject of litigation. The outcome of this litigation, however, has been
much more certain. Claims based on breach of express or implied
warranties under the Uniform Commercial Code must generally be
brought within four years of the breach.295 A claim for relief under
the U.C.C. accrues "when the breach occurs, regardless of the ag-
grieved party's lack of knowledge of the breach."2 96 The foregoing
provisions contemplate the existence of a contract between a buyer
and seller. In the absence of contractual privity between seller and
ultimate purchaser, any claims by the purchaser sounding in war-
ranty will be deemed tort claims, and subject to the statutes of
limitations. 97
IV. RECOMMENDATIONS FOR REFORM AND FURTHER DEVELOPMENT
A. Strict Liability
Some advocates of tort reform have expressed the concern
that strict liability represents a radical shift in tort liability con-
cepts. Nevertheless, the doctrine is here to stay. Moreover, it is
difficult to argue that the doctrine is unfair, especially in a society
where the manufacturer has significantly more bargaining power in
the marketplace than the consumer, and where evaluating the con-
duct of one manufacturer is made difficult, if not impossible, by
the involvement of numerous planners and workers in the design
and manufacturing processes. These developments through the
years have convinced courts that suing manufacturers in negli-
gence presents an almost insurmountable task to the aggrieved
plaintiff. There is no indication that society's economic structure
has so changed that strict liability in tort is no longer necessary to
provide plaintiffs the needed avenue of relief when they are injured
by defective products.
Although the doctrine is definitely here to stay, and although
it undoubtedly serves a valid purpose in the panoply of tort reme-
dies, the Montana Supreme Court's treatment of the doctrine has
often been one-sided. This is particularly evident in the failure to
295. MONT. CODE ANN. § 30-2-725(1) (1985). Parties to a contract may by agreement
lower the limitations period to not less than one year; they may not extend it. Id.
296. MONT. CODE ANN. § 30-2-725(2) (1985).
297. Schlenz v. John Deere Co., 511 F. Supp. 224, 226 n.1 (1985); Hornung, 317 F.
Supp. at 184; Bennett __ Mont. -, 713 P.2d at 995.
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develop fair and meaningful affirmative defenses. Moreover, the
failure of the court to develop specific criteria for the applicability
of the doctrine engenders a great deal of uncertainty to plaintiffs
and defendants alike in anticipating the limits of the doctrine.298
Although the Rix299 decision is a hopeful sign that the court will
pay more attention to the development of criteria in the future, it
would perhaps be best if the legislature stepped in and began codi-
fying the doctrine. Codification should include specific criteria for
establishing manufacturing defects, design defects, whether inad-
vertent design errors °00 or conscious design choices, and the failure
to warn. The Restatement of Torts and model legislative acts like
the UPLA could serve as the starting point for legislation in Mon-
tana. The legislature should strive for precision when defining the
scope of liability and damages, and should obviate the need for the
judiciary to define key concepts in the statute. There is a need for
certainty in identifying the-rights and responsibilities of manufac-
turers and consumers. Both will benefit if each knows in advance
of litigation what rights will be honored and what obligations will
be imposed. This degree of certainty is not assured when develop-
ment of the tort system is left solely to the courts.
In addition to codifying the basic elements of strict liability
actions and defenses, the legislature should reverse the path taken
by the Montana Supreme Court in Zahrtes01 concerning affirma-
tive defenses. The legislature should enact a pure comparative
fault scheme in strict liability actions, with the only exception that
assumption of the risk should remain an absolute defense to recov-
ery. Comparative fault simply infuses an element of fairness into
the liability matrix. Plaintiffs whose conduct may not approach as-
sumption of the risk, yet still be negligent, should not be entitled
to recover the full amount of their damages, even when it can be
successfully argued that the defendant's product was in a defective
condition, unreasonably dangerous. Comparative fault principles
should be used to reduce proportionately the damages awarded by
the jury. Unlike Montana's comparative negligence scheme, the
system should be pure, such that a plaintiff who is even found to
be ninety-nine percent at fault should still recover the one percent
of the total damages attributable to the defects in the defendant's
298. This problem has been obviated to some extent by the decision in Rix v. General
Motors Corp., - Mont. __, 723 P.2d 195.
299. Id.
300. Presumably, evidence of industry and/or government standards would be admis-
sible on the question of whether the product design posed an unreasonable risk of harm to
the product's user. See Tobias & Rossbach, supra note 1, at 259.
301. 203 Mont. 90, 661 P.2d 17 (1983).
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product. Pure comparative fault is more in keeping with the poli-
cies behind strict liability.
The suggestion that Montana approve a pure comparative
fault scheme in strict liability cases is admittedly controversial.
Critics of the scheme have argued that it defeats the central pur-
pose of strict liability, which is transferring the risk of harm from
defective products from the injured consumers to the responsible
manufacturer. 02 Critics also argue comparative fault is concep-
tually incongruous with strict liability, as it infuses conduct-based
considerations like negligence into an action where conduct is not
at issue."' Such infusion is also said to be confusing to juries who
will allegedly be confused by handling concepts which are analyti-
cally distinct.30 4 Each argument reflects the narrow theoretical
framework in which they are rooted, which is a tort system
designed to serve only the plaintiff's needs. A tort system should
not be fashioned solely with the interests of the potential plaintiff
in mind. The interests of potential defendants must also be consid-
ered. When conceptualizing a tort system that accommodates the
interests of all parties to litigation, the arguments made by the
critics lose their force, and become less appealing.
It is objectively difficult to argue that the goals of strict liabil-
ity are subverted by comparative fault, when studied in the
broader context of the tort system. The goals are merely balanced
by the equally legitimate goal of preventing plaintiffs from receiv-
ing financial windfalls, despite their wrongful conduct. Similarly,
the alleged incongruity dissipates into theoretical limbo, as the ul-
timate goal of the tort system is to hold each party to account for
its faults. The fault of one is measured by the deficiencies in his
product; the fault of the other is measured by his or her conduct.
Finally, it is unlikely that juries will be confused by these distinc-
tions, as instructions can be carefully drafted to guide the jury in
the process of determining each party's respective fault.
Assumption of the risk should be reinstated as an absolute bar
to recovery. As Judge Murray pointed out in the first Zahrte deci-
sion, assumption of the risk is an extremely difficult defense to es-
tablish.305 If a party is subjectively aware of the dangers posed by
using a certain product, yet knowingly proceeds in such a way as to
bring those risks of danger upon him, there is no just reason why
he should recover for any defects. This is especially true in cases
302. See, e.g., Tobias & Rossbach, supra note 1, at 277.
303. Id.
304. Id.
305. Zahrte v. Sturm, Ruger & Co., 498 F. Supp. 389, 392 (D. Mont. 1980).
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involving claims based on a conscious design choice. It is inconsis-
tent to allow a plaintiff to argue that the design choice involved
more risks than benefits when the plaintiff appreciated the risks
and yet consciously invoked the benefits of the product by using it.
The legislature should also consider enactment of the criteria
set forth in section 402B of the Restatement.306 This section incor-
porates strict liability into situations where a manufacturer has not
so much manufactured a defective product, as misrepresented cer-
tain qualities in the product.3 0 7 Although 402B is vaguely reminis-
cent of the concept of negligent misrepresentation, it is essentially
different. The conduct of the defendant in representing the prod-
uct is no longer an issue. Thus, even if the manufacturer exercises
due care in the representation of his product, he will still be held
strictly liable in tort if the representations are later shown to be
untrue.
B. Negligence
Negligence concepts are already so well defined in statute and
common law that they need no further development by the court.
Should the Montana Legislature eventually adopt a comparative
fault scheme, however, it will probably no longer be necessary for
plaintiffs to plead negligence as a theory of recovery. Strict liability
will then completely subsume negligence theories, especially if a
pure comparative fault system is adopted.30 8
C. Warranty
Even if the legislature eventually adopts a codified scheme of
strict liability standards, warranty theories of recovery will not and
should not disappear. They continue to have much applicability to
commercial transactions. Although the legislative scheme for war-
306. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 402(B) provides as follows:
Misrepresentation by Seller of Chattels to Consumer.
One engaged in the business of selling chattels who, by advertising, labels, or
otherwise, makes to the public a misrepresentation of a material fact concerning
the character or quality of a chattel sold by him is subject to liability for physical
harm to a consumer of the chattel caused by justifiable reliance upon the misrep-
resentation, even though
(a) it is not made fraudulently or negligently, and
(b) the consumer has not bought the chattel from or entered into any contrac-
tual relation with the seller.
307. See id.
308. This prediction may be wishful thinking. It has been the author's experience that
law schools over-emphasize instruction in standard negligence principles to the detriment of
strict liability. This is unfortunate, as strict liability principles are now entering almost
every facet of tort law, and not just products liability.
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ranty actions is well developed, it will be necessary for the courts
to interpret the laws more carefully. In future cases, the court
should repudiate holdings which are inconsistent with the letter
and spirit of the Uniform Commercial Code. 09 Specifically, plain-
tiffs should no longer be required to establish reliance upon partic-
ular express warranties. Similarly, defendants should not be ex-
posed to the prospect that they will be liable for breach of implied
warranty of merchantability as well as the breach of implied war-
ranty for fitness for a particular purpose, especially when the prod-
uct in question was purchased and used for the ordinary purposes
intended for that product. 10
V. ENACTMENTS OF THE 1987 MONTANA LEGISLATURE
As this article goes to press, the Montana Legislature has en-
acted several changes in products liability law. These changes,
signed into law by the governor, will certainly influence the future
development of products liability law in Montana.
Senate Bill 380311 codifies the language of section 402A of the
Restatement. It clarifies the Restatement to the effect that a man-
ufacturer, wholesaler, or retailer of a product may be held strictly
liable in tort.3 12 It provides for two affirmative defenses to strict
liability claims. Manufacturers, wholesalers, and retailers may de-
feat liability in whole or in part if they can establish that (1) the
"user or consumer of the product discovered the defect or the de-
fect was open and obvious and the user or consumer unreasonably
made use of the product and was injured by it";31 3 and/or (2) the
"product was unreasonably misused by the user or consumer and
such misuse caused or contributed to the injury."314 Other varieties
of contributory negligence may not be asserted.31 5 The affirmative
309. Specifically, the court should repudiate the holdings in Whitaker and Streich
criticized in this article. The drafters of the Uniform Commercial Code have put a great deal
of work and effort into interpretation of this document. The courts should pay close atten-
tion to the official comments to the code and reject interpretations clearly outside the
proper scope of the code language.
310. See text accompanying notes 114-18, supra.
311. S. B. 380, 50th Mont. Leg. (1987) was signed by the governor on April 4, 1987. No
effective date is set forth in the law, so it automatically becomes effective on October 1,
1987. See MONT. CODE ANN. § 1-2-301(1) (1987) (providing for October 1 effective date for
all legislation not containing specific effective dates).
312. S. B. 380, § 1(1).
313. S. B. 380, § 1(5)(a). For the purpose of invoking the defense, the requirement
that the consumer make unreasonable use of the product applies whether the consumer
discovered the defect, or whether the defect is open and obvious.
314. S. B. 380, § 1(5)(b).
315. S. B. 380, § 1(5). Presumably, failure to discover a defect is among those varieties
of contributory negligence not permissible as a defense.
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defenses mentioned above will "mitigate or bar recovery and must
be applied in accordance with" the comparative negligence
statute." '
Senate Bill 380 essentially incorporates a modified compara-
tive fault scheme into strict liability cases. The first defense ac-
knowledges the limited defense of assumption of the risk, but ap-
parently goes further by repudiating Brown and its progeny by
imposing comparative liability on a plaintiff who makes unreasona-
ble use of a product where the defect is open and obvious.31 7 The
second defense precludes recovery in whole or in part for "unrea-
sonable misuse." This confusing concept is not defined in the stat-
ute, and will undoubtedly invite litigation. Of particular concern
will be the issue of whether the user's conduct is to be measured by
objective criteria or subjective knowledge.
Senate Bill 121318 establishes criteria for determining when
firearms or ammunition may not be considered defectively
designed. Specifically, plaintiffs will no longer be permitted to ar-
gue that the benefits of the product are outweighed by the risks of
injury or death posed by the products.31 9 Injuries from discharge of
a firearm or ammunition will be deemed "proximately caused by
the discharge of the product, ' 320 and not by the "potential [of the
product] to cause serious injury, damage or death ... "321 A claim
for relief may be predicated upon "improper selection of design
alternatives. ,322
Senate Bill 121 limits plaintiffs in their attempts to seek re-
covery for firearm or ammunition related injuries. The legislature
may be faulted for not expressly declaring in statute the policy
reasons behind this limitation. Moreover, in view of the confusion
surrounding the adoption and subsequent rejection of Constitu-
tional Initiative 30, the legislature's attempt to limit any tort reme-
dies may be open to judicial scrutiny.23 Further, inquiries here are
316. S. B. 380, § 1(6).
317. See text accompanying notes 40-46, supra.
318. S. B. 121, 50th Mont. Leg. (1987) was signed into law on April 7, 1987. Like S. B.
380, it becomes effective October 1, 1987.
319. S. B. 121, § 1(1).
320. S. B. 121, § 1(2)(b).
321. Id.
322. S. B. 121, § 1(3).
323. This initiative, passed by Montana's voters on November 4, 1986, amends MONT.
CONST. art. II, § 16, by authorizing the legislature to modify or even eliminate common law
rights and remedies. However, the Montana Supreme Court voided the amendment, citing
technical errors in the presentation and explanation of the initiative to the voters. See State
ex rel. Montana Citizens for the Preservation of Citizens' Rights v. Waltermire, - Mont.
-, - P.2d -, 44 St. Rptr. 913 (1987).
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outside the scope of this article.2 All that need be stated is that
the recent legislative changes will likely invite significant interpre-
tive litigation, contrary to the intentions of the drafters of these
changes.
VI. CONCLUSION
The authors of the 1977 article anticipated that products lia-
bility law would be well developed in Montana within a few years.
Perhaps due to the size of the state's population, this has not been
the case. Moreover, when the courts are faced with developing
products liability law, they have failed to articulate sufficiently cer-
tain standards so as to apprise the bench and bar of the direction
of the law. In certain instances, development of the doctrine has
been considerably one-sided, and without a proper analytical justi-
fication. This article has shown some of the weaknesses in the ex-
isting law. Attorneys, courts, and legislators should carefully at-
tend to the development and refinement of the law of products
liability, including recent statutory amendments, and construct a
system that is fair to manufacturers and consumers.
324. Further inquiries here are outside the scope of this article. For a discussion of
Constitutional Initiative 30, see Burke, Constitutional Initiative 30: What Constitutional
Rights Did Montanans Surrender in Hopes of Securing Liability Insurance?, 48 MONT. L.
REV. 53 (1987). See also Lopach, The Montana Supreme Court in Politics, 48 MONT. L. REV.
267 (1987).
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